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ABSTRACT 
 
The Memory Wars: Debates on the Holocaust and the Legacy of anti-Semitism in Poland 
 
Jonathan Andrew Bergquist 
 
 The process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or mastering the past, is often slow and 
painful.  All too often nations have a tendency to celebrate their past triumphs while forgetting or 
marginalizing the most traumatic episodes of their histories.  The case of Poland is particularly 
interesting—especially in connection to the disappearance of the country’s minority Jewish 
heritage.  Poland, of course, was the primary site of the Holocaust, and the nearly complete 
destruction of the country’s once vast Jewish population, which had been the largest in the 
world, has left a troublesome legacy behind.  How had such horrific crimes taken place on Polish 
soil?  What role had Poles played in the Nazi slaughter of Jews?  Had Poles been complicit in 
this atrocity?  Or—even worse—were there cases in which Poles had actually participated in the 
barbaric, genocidal violence against Jews?  During the communist era, most Poles did not 
seriously wrestle with the moral problems that arose from the virtual disappearance of Polish 
Jewry; by contrast, the last few decades have seen a dramatic change as Poland has transitioned 
from a communist to a post-communist society.  Indeed, since the 1980s Poland has embarked 
upon a process of major soul-searching, and a series of vexing and polemical debates have 
captured the spotlight in Poland in recent years.  This thesis seeks to analyze these debates and to 
assess how the Polish memory of the Holocaust has evolved during this time.  Finally, this thesis 
attempts to understand the current status of Polish-Jewish relations, especially in relation to the 
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Chapter One: Contextualizing the Memory Wars 
Introduction  
 On Tłomackie Street in Warsaw, the capital of Poland, there once stood a Great 
Synagogue that was known throughout the world for its size, beauty and grandeur.  At the time 
of its construction in 1878, it was the largest synagogue in the world and a powerful symbol of 
the richness of Jewish life in Poland.  But now, where the Great Synagogue once stood, the 
Błękitny Wieżowiec, or Blue Skyscraper, now stands—a testament to capitalism and the 
country’s march toward progress and economic prosperity.  Like so many Jewish cultural 
monuments, Warsaw’s most impressive synagogue did not survive the devastation of the Second 
World War.   All around Poland the modern world collides with history.  Even Warsaw itself, a 
city that was razed to the ground by Hitler’s forces, seems forever caught between two worlds, 
perpetually stuck in the struggle between remembering and forgetting.  But the horrors of the 
Holocaust would make it far more difficult to speak of the memory of Polish Jews; moreover, the 
absence of Jewish life has left a void in Poland, a vast chasm of collective amnesia for what was 
once Europe’s largest and most vibrant community of Jews.  But what would come to fill this 
void in the aftermath of the war?  And what would happen when this missing history—and the 
memory of the millions of Jews systematically murdered during WWII—resurfaced?   
 The history of the Holocaust, of course, is no ordinary history. Indeed, the Holocaust 
represents by far the darkest event in twentieth-century European history.  In what was supposed 
to be the age of modernity, an era of inexorable progress on all fronts, a collapse into such total 
genocidal barbarism seemed absurd and impossible.1  How could post-Enlightenment Europe 
                                                          
1 It has also been argued, however, that modernity itself was a necessary precursor to the Holocaust; for this 
perspective, see Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
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have been the site of such egregious death and despair?  In the immediate aftermath of the war, 
culpability for all of the unfathomable carnage seemed obvious to many.    Total blame in Europe 
was placed on Nazi Germany and its racist, fascistic ideology.  In this way fascism—and 
especially Nazism—became synonymous with evil.  Indeed, according to this interpretation, 
despite their sincere resistance, the various nations under German occupation were powerless as 
Hitler massacred the Jews of Europe. This myth, which found the Nazis alone guilty for all the 
war’s mass murder and genocide, could not survive the scrutiny of rigorous historical 
scholarship.2  The harsh reality turned out to be that throughout much of occupied Europe there 
was widespread collaboration and complicity with the Nazi regime, a fact now well documented 
by historians.   
All across Europe historians have now subverted collective memory by challenging 
celebratory, nationalistic narratives that sought to obscure the historical record.  In the case of 
France, for example, the extent and enthusiasm of Vichy collaboration has now been extensively 
studied by scholars.3  In Germany, too, scholars have played an indispensable role in the struggle 
against historical obfuscation.  Whereas many Germans sought to portray the Wehrmacht as an 
institution essentially innocent of the evils of the Nazi regime, this myth has now been 
essentially devastated by contemporary scholarship. 4 Of course, many German historians have 
also fiercely resisted the scholarship that they perceived as condemning their nation. It should 
come as no surprise that Germany was home to the Historikerstreit, or historians’ quarrel, in 
                                                          
2 For a brief description how this myth was cultivated, see Tony Judt, “The Past is Another Country,” 
Daedalus 121, no. 4 (Fall 1992). 
3 See, for example, Robert Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944 (New York: 
Alfred A Knopf, 1972); also see Michael R. Marrus and Robert Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (New York: 
Basic Books, 1981). 
4 This is well documented, for instance, in Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the 
Third Reich (Oxford University Press, 1992); furthermore, see Waitman Wade Beorn, Marching into Darkness: The 
Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belarus (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
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which historians dueled over the uniqueness of the Holocaust and the inevitability of Nazism. A 
similar debate spawned by Daniel Goldhagen’s Hitler's Willing Executioners,5 which argued that 
a unique bloodthirsty “eliminationist” anti-Semitism was so deeply rooted in German history and 
society that it affected how virtually all Germans viewed Jews during the Second World War.  
Especially in the countries that were under Nazi occupation, it is important to note that none of 
these challenges to post-war collective memory should be conceived as relativizing the crimes of 
Hitler’s regime.  Nor do they absolve the Third Reich of any crime—whether individual or 
collective—committed during Hitler’s reign.  Still, these claims of collaboration (and sometimes 
worse) were deeply troubling.  The moral legacy of much of Europe was at stake.   
In contrast to Western Europe, and in part due to the dictatorial communist regimes that 
suppressed memory, Eastern Europeans lagged behind when it came to confronting their 
respective histories.6  But the floodgates of history have been blasted open in recent years and 
suppressed memory has returned with a vengeance throughout Central and Eastern Europe.7  The 
case of Poland, of course, is no exception.  Quite the opposite in fact: post-communist Poland 
has emerged as the region’s leader in terms of wrestling with the politics of memory and history.  
Much of this struggle is concerned with coming to terms with the country’s communist past.  
Other mnemonic struggles have concerned Polish-German or Polish-Ukrainian relations.  
Perhaps most importantly, however, in recent years Poland has embarked upon a process of 
reassessing the Holocaust and the Polish-Jewish past much more broadly.  The ensuing debates 
                                                          
5 Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf); Goldhagen’s understanding of German anti-Semitism has been criticized—justifiably—by many 
historians.  For a good discussion of some of the problems inherent in Goldhagen’s book, see Christopher Browning, 
review of Hitler's Willing Executioners, History and Memory 8, no.1 (Spring-Summer 1996): 88-108.  
6 Judt, 109. 
7 For a fascinating collection of essays on the struggle over memory of the Holocaust that covers the entire 
region, see John-Paul Himka and Joanna Beata Michlic, ed., Bringing the Dark Past to Light: The Reception of the 
Holocaust in Postcommunist Europe (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013). 
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and discussions—which I designate the Memory Wars—have generated enormous controversy 
and confusion throughout the country. 
Before diving into the Memory Wars, however, it is necessary to provide some historical 
context.  The roughly 1000 year history of Polish Jews—much like the history of Poland more 
generally8—is quite complex.  Jewish migration to Poland, particularly beginning in the 
fourteenth century, occurred for several reasons: first, it was partially caused by religious 
persecution in the West—especially in the Germanic states; and secondly, it was partially caused 
by Polish monarchs who offered greater tolerance and better economic prospects than Western 
leaders in order to increase the populations of their own lands and enhance their revenue through 
taxation.9  Prior to the modern era, Polish-Jewish relations were rarely characterized by violence; 
in fact, it has been poignantly noted that the relationship between Poles and Jews could perhaps 
best be described as “mutual good natured contempt.”10  At some point, however, this good 
natured contempt evolved into something far more sinister.  Exactly how and when this 
happened, it is fair to say, is a question that is open to interpretation.  Theodore R. Weeks, for 
example, provides one very plausible explanation.  Weeks maintains that the birth of nationalism 
in Poland, which occurred in a unique situation compared to the rest of Central and Eastern 
Europe, was crucial.  Unlike in these other countries, Poland had developed a thriving high 
culture and had attained political independence only to be subjugated by the end of the 
eighteenth century.  Partially as a result of the perceived existential threat posed by the Russian 
                                                          
8 For an in depth examination of Polish history, see Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of 
Poland, Volume I and II (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 
9 Robert Blobaum, introduction to Antisemitism and its Opponents in Modern Poland, ed. Robert Blobaum 




Empire,11 which was where most Poles lived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
the lack of Jewish assimilation with mainstream Polish culture was perceived in an especially 
negative light.  Moreover, anti-Semitic attitudes imported from the West, coupled with Catholic 
influence, also played a contributing factor.12  When the Polish state reemerged during the 
interwar period, it was clear that attitudes toward Jews had deteriorated drastically.  Following a 
surge of ethno-nationalism, there was a wave of anti-Semitic violence in Poland.  This was often 
followed by a celebration of the perpetrators of such acts as national heroes and a shifting of 
blame for such violence onto Jews.13  This anti-Semitic violence would continue to escalate until 
climaxing during and after the Second World War.  More specific details about the exact nature 
of crimes committed will be dealt with in subsequent chapters. 
More needs to be said about what the Memory Wars actually are and how they came to 
be.  It is worth pointing out that the reassessment of the Polish-Jewish past emerged at a 
particular historical moment and that this was no coincidence.  During the communist era, Poles 
and Jews were portrayed in solidarity with one another and any discussion of anti-Semitic 
violence by Poles—if it was publicly mentioned at all—was always marginalized.14  When Karol 
Józef Wojtyła, who would come to be known as John Paul II, was elected Pope in 1978, it 
inspired the Polish nation like no other event in decades and helped to lay the foundations for the 
mass opposition of the Solidarność, or Solidarity, movement of the 1980s.  Eventually, this non-
                                                          
11 The anxiety over the existential threat described by Weeks would eventually erupt into revolution and 
major social upheaval; see, for example, Robert Blobaum, Rewolucja: Russian Poland, 1904-1907 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1995), which describes the underlying social tensions that contributed to the political turmoil. 
12 Theodore R. Weeks, “Assimilation, Nationalism, Modernization,” in Antisemitism and its Opponents in 
Modern Poland, 20-38. 
13Joanna Beata Michlic, Poland’s Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 109. 
14 Joanna Beata Michlic, Coming to Terms with the “dark past”: The Polish Debate about the Jedwabne 
Massacre (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2002), 3. 
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violent revolutionary movement would lead to the Round Table talks of 1989 and the collapse of 
the communist government.  With the new political climate made possible by Solidarność, Poles 
began to slowly reexamine their recent history, including the Polish-Jewish past.15  Then, in the 
1990s, Poland embarked upon a major period of transition, undergoing shock therapy based 
economic reforms and rapid democratization.  In 1991, Poland was a founding member of the 
Visegrad Group, which would pave the way for later NATO and EU accession.  In short, this 
was a transformational time in Polish history.  It was a period marked by vast challenges to 
authority and conventional wisdom, major social upheaval and a fundamental reorientation of 
Polish politics.  It is unsurprising, therefore, that challenges to Polish collective memory would 
begin to emerge during this tumultuous period of unrest and rapid social change. 
Research Motivation and Methodology 
 This thesis will investigate the role the Memory Wars have played in framing—or 
perhaps more accurately reframing—Polish understanding of Polish-Jewish relations.  
Furthermore, it will analyze the diverse responses of Poles to the new interpretations of the 
Second World War and the Holocaust that have appeared since the end of communist rule in 
Poland.  This discussion will be broad.  It will be informed by the reactions of Polish scholars, 
artists and filmmakers, government officials and numerous journalists.  Other problems or 
questions will be addressed along the way.  What role, for example, have these debates played in 
shaping or altering the representation of Jews in Poland?  How have Poles dealt with—or, when 
relevant, failed to deal with—the demons of their past?  The vast debates over Polish-Jewish 
                                                          
 15 Ibid, 4-5.  
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relations at the heart of the Memory Wars will be used as a conceptual tool to explore these 
larger issues.   
This project will ideally result in at least three important outcomes.  First and foremost, it 
will show that historians have not merely retreated to their ivory towers, engaged in abstruse 
debates far removed from anything of any relevance or concern to the general public.  On the 
contrary, many of the issues historians grapple with often have massive implications for 
collective memory and real world social problems.  Secondly, this project will attempt to show 
that dealing with the hard problems of the past is no meaningless intellectual exercise.  
Confronting a troubled history can instead have profound social implications, which alter the 
way nations envision their past and their future.  Thirdly, to the extent that Poland has been 
successful in wrestling with its past, this project can help shed light on why that might be and 
how other European nations, which maybe have not been as successful as Poland in this regard, 
can learn from its example.   
Ultimately, it will be argued that the Memory Wars are part of a broad trend underway in 
Polish society that that is tied to Poland’s democratization.  The main goal is not to demonstrate 
a strong causal link between the Memory Wars and a profound change in Polish attitudes.  In 
fact, no such profound change has occurred, and the most recent controversies over the Polish-
Jewish past demonstrate that the Memory Wars are as hotly contested as ever.  It will be 
asserted, however, that the reassessment of the Polish-Jewish past—exemplified in the works of 
various scholars, journalists and other figures—represents the most serious and provocative 
challenge to Poland’s national memory in the country’s history.  Indeed, as a result of numerous 
attempts over the last several decades to undermine the nationalistic narratives that emerged in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, Poland is now dealing with its own version of 
Bergquist 8 
 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or mastering the past, a notion of crucial importance in the German 
historiography of the Holocaust.  Poland’s Vergangenheitsbewältigung has not been an easy 
journey; indeed, it has been a constant back-and-forth struggle, and there are still disturbing 
right-wing and ultra-nationalistic tendencies that emerge whenever the Polish-Jewish past enters 
into public discourse.  The process of coming to terms with the past in Poland, it must 
furthermore be pointed out, cannot be reduced to a single debate or incident; instead, Poland’s 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung must be understood as part of a broad, cumulative process that 
began to pick up steam in the 1980s and is still very much ongoing.  This process accelerated in 
the early 2000s when, for the first time, significant numbers of Poles began to recognize the 
importance of accepting responsibility for their history.  While the empirical evidence on the 
current status of anti-Semitism in contemporary Poland remains unclear, although anti-Semitism 
undoubtedly is still pervasive throughout Poland, it will nevertheless be argued that Poland’s 
willingness to confront the demons of history is a crucial step toward atonement and 
reconciliation.   
This project is conceived as an intended contribution to the field of memory studies, an 
interdisciplinary field which has helped to transform the humanities and the social sciences over 
the last several decades. Because this project focuses on how Poles conceive of their history, the 
distinction between primary and secondary sources is necessarily blurred and arguably breaks 
down entirely.  Texts which might ordinarily be conceived as secondary sources are sometimes 
reformulated as primary sources and as expressions of Polish memory.  This project also draws 
heavily on films, newspapers and official political statements. In recent years a huge body of 
literature debating the Polish-Jewish past has appeared in both Polish and, to a lesser extent, 
English.  Much of the recent historiography on the Polish-Jewish past can be construed in one of 
Bergquist 9 
 
two ways: first, there is a large body of literature which attacks (or defends) the aforementioned 
nationalistic narratives of WWII; and secondly, there is a much smaller body of literature which 
discusses Polish memory more generally. This thesis, ultimately, contributes to both of these 
literatures.  First and foremost, this thesis is the most up-to-date presentation of Polish-Jewish 
relations and it analyzes, contextualizes and brings together these various mnemonic 
controversies in ways unlike any other academic source.  Secondly, this project attempts to 
incorporate polling data into the discussion, which helps make its analysis a little less elite driven 
than what has prevailed in most of the existing literature.  Thirdly, much of what has been 
written utilizes concepts like “collective responsibility” and “reconciliation” in a vague and often 
unsophisticated way.  This project thus seeks to bring some much needed analytical clarity 
toward these sorts of issues, the amorphous nature of which undoubtedly has been one of the key 












Chapter Two: Early Challenges to Polish Memory 
Shoah 
 The Polish response to Claude Lanzmann’s 1985 film Shoah represents one of the earliest 
manifestations of the Memory Wars.  Indeed, the French filmmaker’s nearly ten hour 
documentary provoked tremendous anger in Poland due to its perceived emphasis on the 
complicity of Poles in the Nazi extermination of Jews and a lack of emphasis on issues like 
Polish suffering and heroism during the war.  As a result of these alleged shortcomings, Jerzy 
Turowicz, a leading Polish journalist at the time, described Lanzmann’s groundbreaking film as 
“biased” and “anti-Polish.”16  Outside of Poland, however, Shoah was generally met with high 
praise.  In the United States, for example, Pulitzer Prize-winning film critic Roger Ebert 
described the documentary as “an act of witness” that was among “the noblest films ever.”17  
Similarly, Richard Bernstein of the New York Times described Shoah as “(awakening) a new 
consciousness about the greatest evil of modern times.”18  The critic Richard Brody, moreover, 
lauded Lanzmann’s magnum opus as “instantly historic.”19  The renowned French existentialist 
and feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, finally, described Shoah as a “sheer 
masterpiece.”20 
 It ought to be noted that debating the Polish-Jewish past or exploring the legacy of anti-
Semitism in Poland were not necessarily the main motivations behind Lanzmann’s film.  On the 
                                                          
16 Joanna Szczęsna, “25 lat sporów o 'Shoah,’” Gazeta Wyborcza, 
http://wyborcza.pl/2029020,76842,7694169.html. 
17 Roger Ebert, “Review of Shoah” http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/great-movie-shoah-1985. 
18 Richard Bernstein, “Shoah (1985) an Epic Film about the Greatest Evil of Modern Times” The New York 
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/movie/review?res=9805E5DC1E39F933A15753C1A963948260. 
19 Richard Brody, “Witness: Claude Lanzmann and the Making of Shoah,” 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/19/witness-5?currentPage=all. 
20 Simone de Beauvoir, Preface to Claude Lanzmann, Shoah: An Oral History of the Holocaust: The 
Complete Text of the Film (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), x. 
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contrary, Shoah at its core sought to describe the Holocaust through the experiences of actual 
participants in the Holocaust—including both victims and victimizers.  In order to get the latter 
perspective, Lanzmann often went to great lengths, including the extensive use of hidden 
cameras, which even resulted in his hospitalization following an assault by a former Nazi who 
was furious when he discovered he was being surreptitiously filmed.21  Shoah, ultimately, did not 
rely upon any historical footage; instead, Lanzmann reconstructed the memory of the Holocaust 
solely through his interviews with those who had first-hand experiences of the Shoah and by 
traveling to and filming the sites where the Holocaust actually occurred.22  In this manner 
Lanzmann hoped “to reincarnate” the tragic experiences of the millions of Jews systematically 
exterminated during the Second World War.23 
Though Lanzmann did not necessarily intend to create controversy in Poland, it is not 
hard to see why his film angered many Poles.  As De Beauvoir noted, the majority of Poles 
interviewed in the film appear indifferent to the fate of Jews or even satisfied by what 
transpired.24  Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, much of the debate in Poland focused not on the 
merits of the film but instead on how Lanzmann chose to portray Polish bystanders who 
witnessed the extermination of Polish Jews.25  To further complicate matters, the vast majority of 
Poles—including many of Shoah’s most vocal critics—never actually watched Lanzmann’s film, 
and it was largely the Polish media’s interpretation of the film that framed public opinion on the 
issue.26  It has even been alleged that the Polish government asked François Mitterrand, France’s 
                                                          
21 Brody, “Witness,” http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/19/witness-5?currentPage=all. 
22 Bernstein, “Shoah,” 
http://www.nytimes.com/movie/review?res=9805E5DC1E39F933A15753C1A963948260 
23 Ibid. 
24 De Beauvoir, Preface to Shoah, viii. 
25 Piotr Forecki, Reconstructing Memory: the Holocaust in Polish Public Debates (Peter Lang, 2013), 104. 
26 Ibid, 105. 
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president at the time, to ban the film.27  Whatever the case, it is not difficult to imagine why the 
Polish state would have wanted to discourage the public from seeing Shoah, which would have 
made it even more difficult for ordinary Poles to seriously grapple with the issues brought to the 
forefront by Lanzmann’s film.  To make matters worse, Lanzmann made numerous troublesome 
claims in relation to the controversy that were widely publicized in the Polish media, which 
made serious reflection on the Holocaust and Polish-Jewish relations even less likely.  For 
example, Lanzmann argued that anti-Semitism was a necessary feature of Catholicism and that 
the Third Reich had chosen Poland to carry out its genocidal plans because the Nazis knew that 
Poles would permit the extermination of Jews on their soil.28  Of course, such claims are deeply 
problematic to say the least, and it is easy to see why such controversial—and technically 
inaccurate—statements would further exacerbate the controversy.  As a matter of fact, Poland 
was chosen as the primary site of the Nazi death camps because of the convenience of the 
country’s vast Jewish population and because the Nazis wished to carry out the majority of their 
crime outside their own national borders.  Similarly, while Catholic-Jewish relations are 
historically problematic, it is undoubtedly unfair to imply that all Catholics are anti-Semites. 
Ultimately, Shoah’s role in the Memory Wars is not entirely clear.  While it is evident 
that the film engaged the issue of Polish complicity in the Holocaust, the opportunity for serious 
reflection on this issue was probably squandered.  Still, Lanzmann’s film posed an early 
challenge to the Polish memory of the Holocaust and spawned a multitude of angry responses 
from Polish intellectuals and from the Polish press.  Undoubtedly, therefore, Shoah helped to get 
Poles engaged in these issues.  While the discussion following the film’s release was not exactly 
                                                          
27 Brody, “Witness,” http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/19/witness-5?currentPage=all. 
28 Forecki, Reconstructing Memory, 105. 
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nuanced, Shoah demonstrated how emotionally invested many Poles already were in debates 
over the Polish-Jewish past and the Holocaust.  Lanzmann’s film, moreover, provided a window 
into the attitudes of many Polish journalists and intellectuals’ views on the legacy of anti-
Semitism in Poland and the question of Holocaust responsibility in the mid-1980s.  Shoah likely 
failed to significantly alter attitudes in Poland, but Lanzmann’s film helped to lay the 
foundations for future dialogue and debate on these issues. 
 
The Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto 
 It would probably be hyperbolic to say that Jan Błoński, an eminent Polish historian and 
literary critic, fired the first shot in the Memory Wars; after all, there were undoubtedly 
numerous efforts to engage with the Polish-Jewish past within Poland that predated the 
publication of his seminal essay, “The Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto,” which originally appeared 
in the Catholic magazine Tygodnik Powszechny in 1987.29  Nevertheless, Błoński’s article 
arguably represented the earliest and most serious attempt by a Polish scholar to argue for some 
degree of national responsibility and regret for the Holocaust.  Indeed, unlike with Shoah, “The 
Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto” expressed the views of someone who truly understood Polish 
history and politics.   
Błoński’s article takes its name from Polish Nobel laureate Czesław Miłosz’s poem “A 
Poor Christian Looks at the Ghetto,” which is widely read as acknowledging Christendom’s role 
in the slaughter of Jews during the Holocaust.30  Błoński’s tone is deeply moralistic in his article.  
                                                          
29 It ought to be noted that it is rather unsurprising that it was Tygodnik Powszechny, Poland’s most 
independent legal magazine at the time, which published Błoński’s article; Antony Polonsky, introduction to My 
Brother’s Keeper?: Recent Polish Debates on the Holocaust, ed. Antony Polonsky (London: Routledge, 1990), 10. 
30 Ibid, 11. 
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According to Błoński, remembering and interpreting what transpired during the Holocaust is an 
ethically and spiritually obligatory pursuit that cannot be allowed to disappear into the oblivion 
of forgetfulness.  For Błoński, indeed, even unpleasant histories must always be confronted: 
“(Our country) is a home which is built above all of memory; memory is at the core of our 
identity. We cannot dispose of it at will, even though as individuals we are not directly 
responsible for the actions of the past. We must carry it within us even though it is unpleasant or 
painful. We must also strive to expiate it.”31  
 For Błoński, however, history had failed to expiate this unpleasant past, and there was 
still much soul-searching to be done.  While he acknowledged that historians had debated Polish 
anti-Semitism and the Holocaust with increasing sophistication and documentation, Błoński saw 
their arguments as part of a never-ending discussion, which he compared to an imaginary 
dialogue that was all too real for Poles who had traveled throughout the West.32  In this dialogue 
a Pole and an unidentified foreigner wrestle over the issue of the Polish-Jewish past.  Why, the 
foreigner asks, had Poles been so intolerant toward Jews throughout history?  And why had Poles 
not been able to envision a culturally and ethnically diverse Poland that included both Poles and 
Jews living together as neighbors?  Finally, why had Poles not done more to save Jews during 
the Holocaust? For each of these questions posed to the hypothetical Pole, and for each 
additional question not listed here, an excuse is offered.  Rather than embrace the dark past, the 
Pole offered nothing but endless rationalizations, but the troublesome history of Polish-Jewish 
relations, Błoński maintained, could not be dismissed with mere rationalizations. Instead, Poles 
were obligated to confront the Holocaust directly and embark upon a “moral revolution” that had 
                                                          
31 Jan Błoński, “The Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto,” My Brother’s Keeper?, 35.  
32 Ibid, 37. 
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the power to “cleanse (Poland’s) desecrated soil.”33 In order to achieve this lofty goal, Błoński 
argued that Poles had to recognize their own ethical shortcomings during the Second World War 
and embrace their failure to come to the aid of Jews butchered by the Nazi regime. During the 
Holocaust, too many Poles had ignored the plight of their Jewish neighbors.  And far too many 
Poles, Błoński alleged, had taken secret delight that Hitler had solved Poland’s “Jewish problem” 
for them.34  And now he thought it was time to apologize to Jews around the world.  For Błoński, 
ultimately, there was a deep problem with how Poles conceptualized the Holocaust and there was 
no doubt that Poles shared moral responsibility for the genocide.  Nevertheless, Błoński 
disentangled shared responsibility from outright Holocaust participation, which he completely 
denied in his article.  Błoński’s view was that Poles had turned their backs on Polish Jews, but 
they had not actually participated in any act of mass murder directly—a view that would later be 
repudiated by Jan Tomasz Gross when details of the Jedwabne pogrom came to light.35 
Because Błoński’s article challenged Polish memory in such a profound way, it resulted 
in considerable controversy and debate.  In fact, following the publication of “The Poor Poles 
look at the Ghetto,” Tygodnik Powszechny received numerous letters in response to Błoński’s 
challenge—often with anti-Semitic undertones—that were far too vitriolic for publication.36  
Władysław Siła-Nowicki, a lawyer famous for defending the political prisoners of the 
communist regime, remarked that Błoński’s article was the culmination of a “virulent anti-Polish 
propaganda campaign” that had been carried out by the enemies of the Polish nation.37  Siła-
                                                          
33 Ibid, 45. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Jan T. Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton 
University Press, 2001). 
36 Michael T. Kaufman, “Debate over Holocaust stirs passion in Poland,” New York Times, March 8, 1987, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/08/world/debate-over-holocaust-stirs-passions-in-poland.html 
37 Władysław Siła-Nowicki, “A Reply to Jan Błoński,” My Brother’s Keeper?, 59. 
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Nowicki was hardly alone with these views.  Indeed, many Poles reacted with very similar 
sentiments.  Witold Rymanowski, for example, argued that Błoński had slandered the Polish 
nation, a crime punishable by law, and characterized Błoński’s conclusion as “diabolically 
perverse.”38  Not all Polish intellectuals or journalists reacted with as much anger as 
Rymanowski or Siła-Nowicki.  Consider, for example, Janina Walewska’s essay in response to 
the controversy, which also originally appeared in Tygodnik Powszechny.  Walewska’s views, 
like many Polish intellectuals, were deeply conflicted on the issue of Polish-Jewish relations. On 
the one hand, she understood—and was highly sympathetic toward—the views expressed by 
Błoński.  On the other hand, she acknowledged that anti-Semitic attitudes had been deeply 
engrained in her consciousness all throughout her life, which made Błoński’s view a very 
difficult position to endorse wholeheartedly.  Furthermore, Walewska maintained that Błoński 
was correct about the anti-Semitic nature of Poland both before and after the Second World War 
and that his critics like Siła-Nowicki were simply wrong when they tried to deny the extent of 
anti-Semitism in contemporary Polish society.39  Ultimately, Walewska argued, there was a 
genuine need for Poles to take collective responsibility for the fate of Polish Jews during the 
Second World War. 
For shining a light on the importance of the Holocaust to the question of Polish-Jewish 
relations, Błoński and Lanzmann undoubtedly deserve credit.  It is also quite clear that the debate 
over Błoński’s article was a crucial moment in the Memory Wars. Whereas Poles had previously 
reacted very defensively when troublesome questions about the Polish-Jewish past were brought 
to light, as in the case of Shoah, Błoński openly challenged the Polish memory of the Holocaust 
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and demanded a reinterpretation of the dominant historical narratives that defined the Second 
World War and the Holocaust for the Polish public; nevertheless, because the readership of 
Tygodnik Powszechny was somewhat limited and because Błoński failed to consider actual 
Polish participation in the Holocaust, the debate over “The Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto” 
remained confined to a relatively small part of the Polish population, namely, the intelligentsia.  
With that said, both Shoah and “The Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto” had helped to confirm the 
importance that debates over the Polish-Jewish past had for Poland’s  intelligentsia during the 
1980s.  These debates, however, were still very much in their infancy.  When they would reach 
their crescendo, it would shake the moral foundations of post-communist Poland like nothing 
before or since.  But the debates over Shoah and “The Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto” were not 
the only controversies that were beginning to unravel Polish national memory.  While these 




            In the decades following the Second World War, Auschwitz has emerged as the ultimate 
symbol of the Holocaust.  This is true even though the majority of Jewish Holocaust victims did 
not necessarily perish at death camps like Auschwitz; instead, roughly half of all Jewish victims 
were gunned down with bullets in the so-called Bloodlands.40  But this history has a tendency to 
be superseded by the horrors of the death camps.  Indeed, when the Holocaust is depicted in 
popular media, there is often an emphasis on concentration camp experiences and much of the 
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imagery presented comes directly out of (but is by no means unique to) Auschwitz.  Consider, 
for example, the frequent depictions of the infamous Arbeit Macht Frei sign, images of trains 
crossing under the main arch at the gate of Auschwitz-Birkenau, the notorious gas chambers 
designed to look like showers, the crematoria, the omnipresent hunger and extreme suffering that 
characterized daily life, or the piles of emaciated corpses discovered by Soviet troops.  
Ultimately, the egregious nature of concentration camp life dominates the memory of the 
Holocaust, and no single concentration camp has impacted public consciousness as much as 
Auschwitz.   
Because of the extremely traumatic nature of this history, it should come as no surprise 
that Auschwitz—a place where over one million Jews were systematically slaughtered by the 
Third Reich—has come to be seen as a site of sacred memory for Jews.   Indeed, Auschwitz 
represents the nadir of Jewish historical memory and a disturbing reminder of genocide.  Perhaps 
equally important, however, Auschwitz has come to symbolize the dangers of anti-Semitism and 
the importance of overcoming the past.  During a trip to Poland in 2010, for example, Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained the importance of memory during a speech at 
Auschwitz:  “I have come here today from Jerusalem to tell you: We will never forget. We will 
not allow the Holocaust deniers or those who desecrate [Jewish] graves and signs to erase or 
distort [our] memory… Murderous hatred must be stopped in its tracks, stopped right from the 
beginning. All countries in the world must learn this lesson, just as we did after losing a third of 
our people in blood-soaked Europe.”41  Such commentary, of course, must be interpreted within 
the context of the contemporary Arab-Israeli conflict and is undoubtedly motivated by a desire to 
                                                          




legitimate the Israeli military’s occupation of Palestinian territories in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip.  With that said, the fact that Netanyahu chose Auschwitz as a site to deliver such a 
message carries symbolic weight and highlights its importance within Jewish collective memory. 
Like many memorials, Auschwitz has at times emerged as a site of contested memory.  
Indeed, many Poles also view Auschwitz as a sacred national site.  Of course, this attitude—
much like the Jewish claim to Auschwitz—is undoubtedly well grounded in the facts of history.  
There is no denying that Poles were also victimized by the Nazis.  In fact, Auschwitz I was 
initially constructed for Polish political prisoners, and ultimately around seventy thousand Poles 
perished at the Auschwitz death camps. Moreover, Poland found itself at the crossroads of both 
Soviet and Nazi terror during the war, and the country suffered traumatically as a result.42  
Nevertheless, it is also undeniably true that there exists an asymmetry between Polish and Jewish 
suffering during the war and that Jews were targeted for extermination in a much more deliberate 
manner than Poles.  Despite this asymmetry, in the decades following the Second World War, 
Auschwitz emerged as the primary public space where Poles commemorated their wartime 
dead.43  Auschwitz, indeed, was used by Poles to memorialize their own suffering during the war 
within a nationalistic framework.  During the communist years, the suffering of other national 
groups, by contrast, was placed within an international Marxist-Leninist framework.44  Needless 
to say, this representation necessarily deviated from the historical experiences and the memory of 
Jews.   
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This struggle over the memory of Auschwitz—and its historical meaning—arguably first 
entered public discourse with the Carmelite convent controversy, which brought to the forefront 
the vexing issue of Polish-Jewish relations.  Essentially, the debate was ignited when a group of 
nuns from the Order of Our Lady of Mount Carmel moved into the Theatergebäude, which was 
the Old Theater building right outside Auschwitz I, in 1984.  This building had also been used by 
the Nazis to store Zyklon B during the Holocaust. This action, which was permitted by the Polish 
government, was evidently undertaken without consulting any Polish Jews or Jews living outside 
Poland.45   This decision elicited anger from many Jews around the world.  In response to the 
controversy over Auschwitz, Yitzhak Shamir, who was at the time Prime Minister of Israel, 
infamously remarked in 1989 that “(Poles) suck (anti-Semitism) in with their mother’s milk.”46  
Despite the considerable outcry, the nuns remained steadfast in their resolve.  The convent’s 
superior, Sister Maria Teresa, for example, reportedly said in a 1989 interview that the 
Carmelites would not be “moving a single inch.”47  In the end, however, the Carmelites would be 
forced to move, but it was not until 1993 when Pope John Paul II ordered the remaining nuns to 
leave the convent in a letter.48   
Many Catholic Poles condemned Jews who called for the closure of the Carmelite 
convent, and some prominent Polish clergy even made explicitly anti-Semitic remarks when 
discussing the controversy.  In a 1989 sermon, for instance, Józef Cardinal Glemp reportedly 
claimed that Jews controlled the media and also argued that Jews were somehow culpable for the 
spread of alcoholism across Poland.49  Additionally, Glemp, who was also the Archbishop of 
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Warsaw at the time, made the controversial claim that a small group of Jewish protestors in 1989 
would have killed the nuns of the convent had their protest not been stopped.50 Of course, those 
involved in this protest vehemently reject this accusation.  The Rabbi Avraham Weiss, who was 
the protestors’ leader, has said that the group was quite shocked to be characterized as militants 
in the media and claimed that they had no violent intent whatsoever.51  Rabbi Weiss also claimed 
that the small group crossed the convent’s fence only after their attempts to open a dialogue with 
the nuns were ignored.52  Moreover, their demonstration consisted solely of wrapping themselves 
in prayer shawls and reading and reciting the Torah on the convent’s porch, but workers within 
the convent responded to their peaceful protest by dumping buckets of water mixed with urine 
and paint on the group.  After this strategy failed to convince the protestors to leave, those same 
workers later returned, punching, kicking and attempting to drag the protesters off the convent’s 
grounds.  One worker reportedly shouted, “Heil Hitler!” 53   
Of course, there were also Polish Church leaders who attempted to take steps toward 
Jewish-Christian dialogue in the midst of the controversy.  Pope John Paul II, for example, 
condemned anti-Semitism, referring to it as a “sin against God and humanity” in 1990.54 
Additionally, on January 20, 1991 a pastoral letter was read in every Catholic church across 
Poland that acknowledged a troublesome history and expressed “sorrow for all the injustices and 
harm done to Jews.”55  While this letter made some effort to address the problems that the 
Auschwitz controversy had brought to the surface, the letter rejected the notion that there was 
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anything unique about Polish anti-Semitism.56  Furthermore, the letter emphasized that Poles 
were the first victims of the Nazis and celebrated Polish heroism during the war.57 There also 
was no mention of Polish collaboration or participation in the Holocaust—that conversation 
would have to come later.  With all that said, while this letter did not represent a major step 
toward reconciliation, it still nevertheless demonstrated an attempt at confronting the past in 
some small way.   Furthermore, as the result of a February 1987 agreement between Jewish and 
Catholic leaders, an interfaith center was eventually established to replace the convent.  This 
center, which is known as the Centre for Dialogue and Prayer in Oświęcim, was created in part 
to be a “place of dialogue between people and nations of various cultures and religious beliefs.”58  
Fortunately, the Carmelite convent controversy was resolved, and the establishment of the 
Auschwitz interfaith center was an important early step for Polish-Jewish relations, but it must 
be emphasized that this was largely established through a dialogue between Polish and Jewish 
religious elites, and it was at least partially the result of considerable international pressure.  The 
Polish general public, it must be emphasized, was simply not yet prepared to deal with the deeply 
troublesome history of anti-Semitism in Poland. 
Unfortunately, the debate over Auschwitz was reignited in 1998 when the Polish 
government announced that a large cross outside Block 11, which had been erected by the 
Carmelites before they had been forced to vacate the convent, was going to be removed.  In 
response to this perceived provocation, Polish ultranationalists placed hundreds of smaller 
crosses just outside the grounds of Auschwitz in protest, which surprised and angered Jews 
around the world.  This renewed controversy over the memory of Auschwitz has been referred to 
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as the War of the Crosses.59  Essentially, this second debate began when Krzysztof Śliwiński 
announced in an interview with La Croix, a Catholic newspaper based in France, that the 
Auschwitz cross—referred to by many of its supporters as the “papal cross” because it was 
originally constructed for a special mass following Pope John Paul II’s historic election60—
would be removed just as the Carmelite convent had been removed five years earlier.61  
Śliwiński, for his part, was already prominent in the discussion over Polish-Jewish relations.  
Indeed, during the communist era, Śliwiński had organized various Jewish cemetery cleanups 
and had participated in numerous other pro-Jewish initiatives.  In 1995, moreover, he was 
appointed Poland’s first post-Communist ambassador to the Jewish diaspora by Wladyslaw 
Bartoszewski, who was Foreign Minister at the time.62  But Śliwiński’s comments were met with 
great opprobrium—especially from those engaged in far-right, nationalistic politics.  Antoni 
Macierewicz, for example, characterized Śliwiński’s proposal as a “national humiliation.”63  
Ultimately, over 130 deputies and right-wing senators signed a petition calling for the cross’s 
preservation.64  Even Lech Wałęsa, co-founder of Solidarność and Poland’s second post-
communist President, sided with the supporters of the so-called papal cross in a letter to Bishop 
Tadeusz Rakoczy.65  Another former Solidarność activist, Kazimierz Świtoń, took matters even 
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further by declaring that he would go on a hunger strike until the Catholic Church gave its 
assurances that the cross would not be removed.66  
The War of the Crosses was not simply a controversy confined to the ivory tower.  Nor 
was it simply an issue for religious and political elites.  Instead, the debate’s significance was 
recognized by a large section of the Polish public—some of whom even came to Auschwitz as 
pilgrims during the summer of 1998.  Some of these pilgrims were simply curious tourists.  
Others were journalists looking for a provocative story.  And, of course, some were committed 
nationalists who were determined to defend the notion of a uniquely Catholic Poland.67  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, therefore, prayer vigils and masses were regularly held outside Auschwitz, and 
nationalist symbols—such as the Polish flag and the Polish coat of arms—were prominently 
displayed during their protests alongside religious symbols.68  Within Poland, there has long 
been a close relationship between Catholicism and national identity.  This relationship is 
enormously complex and is the product of a long historical relationship.  While there was 
definite hostility between the Church and the Polish nationalist movement in the nineteenth 
century, there was a clear reconciliation in the early years of the twentieth century; indeed, 
within a few decades, many Poles had embraced the view that a Pole was necessarily Catholic 
and that Catholicism was the bedrock of the nation’s moral and spiritual values.69  During the 
interwar years, moreover, Catholicism was synthesized with Polish national identity in such a 
way that Poles were placed at the top of a racial and cultural hierarchy, whereas Jews were 
located at the bottom.70  This process undoubtedly reinforced anti-Semitic attitudes and 
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contributed to a politics of exclusion where Jews were defined as existing outside the normal 
social and political order.  This was certainly not a phenomenon that was unique to Poland.  In 
fact, the Catholic Church itself has a long history of cultivating anti-Semitism across Europe.71  
Ultimately, the convergence of traditional Catholic anti-Semitism—or Judeophobia—with Polish 
national identity created an atmosphere that was deeply troublesome for Jews.  Thus, given the 
historical experiences of post-communist Poland, which was still a country in transition that was 
desperate to reclaim its national independence and identity after five decades of Soviet 
hegemony, it is not hard to see why the War of the Crosses would strike such a nerve among the 
Polish public. 
The crisis of 1998 was partially resolved when the Polish government agreed to remove 
the myriad crosses placed by the ultranationalists.  The so-called papal cross, however, was not 
removed, and it remains there to this day.  For many Jews the presence of Christian religious 
symbols at Auschwitz is intolerable and distorts the memory of the Holocaust.  Many Poles, by 
contrast, view Auschwitz as a legitimate part of their history and feel that any attempt to remove 
Catholic influence from Auschwitz represents an effort to exclude Poles from a site that is of 
paramount importance to their historical memory as well.  This is undoubtedly a complex issue.  
Nevertheless, it is surely true that one can recognize the undeniable historical reality that Poles 
suffered horrendously during the war—including at Auschwitz—without the presence of 
explicitly Christian symbols at the death camps. 
Ultimately, both the Auschwitz convent controversy and the War of the Crosses brought 
to the forefront numerous issues at the heart of Polish-Jewish relations and the memory of the 
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Second World War.  These debates forced Poles to ask questions that were not necessarily 
discussed at length during much of the communist era.  Who, for instance, were the true victims 
of Auschwitz?  How should both Jewish and Polish suffering during WWII be characterized?  
And additionally, what does it mean to be Polish?  And how has Polish identity related to the 
historical presence of Jews in Poland?  With these controversies, it is evident that the Memory 
Wars were very much underway in Poland.  But one of the central dogmas of Polish memory of 
the Second World War—namely, the narrative of victimization—was about to be challenged in 















Chapter Three: The Neighbors Controversy 
All too frequently nations have a tendency to obscure or marginalize the most shameful 
episodes of their history.  The worst tragedies are sometimes forgotten entirely, but what happens 
when these tragedies resurface?  What happens, indeed, when a national memory is confronted 
by unpleasant truths which it cannot accommodate without serious tension?  Such questions 
cannot be answered in the abstract.  They must be explored on a case-by-case basis.   Fifteen 
years ago, Poland faced this dilemma when Jan Tomasz Gross, now a Professor of History at 
Princeton University, published Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in 
Jedwabne, Poland in 2000.  The publication of Gross’s book sparked national soul-searching and 
extensive debate.  This controversy would place the town of Jedwabne at the center of public 
attention, and it would generate a massive literature and a multitude of attempts to make sense of 
the revelations presented in Gross’s book.   
First, in order to understand why Gross’s book was so controversial, some brief historical 
background is necessary.  In 1939 the Soviet Union agreed to a non-aggression pact with Nazi 
Germany, which would come to be known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.  This agreement 
contained a secret protocol calling for the division of Central and Eastern Europe along German 
and Soviet spheres of influence.  On September 1, 1939 Nazi Germany invaded Poland, 
triggering the Second World War.  The USSR, determined to stake its claim to the territory the 
Nazis had agreed to recognize as part of its sphere of influence, invaded Poland from the east 
sixteen days later.  The small town of Jedwabne, which contained a large population of Jews and 
Poles living together as neighbors, thus found itself under Soviet occupation.  On June 22, 1941 
Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, a massive assault on the Soviet Union.  The Soviets were 
quickly forced back, and the town of Jedwabne then changed hands and fell under Nazi 
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occupation.  Next, something shockingly atrocious happened: the Polish inhabitants of the town 
slaughtered their Jewish neighbors.  Many, indeed, were forced into a barn and burned alive.  
Prior to the publication of Neighbors, this disturbing incident had been largely forgotten by 
historians and other scholars.72 
Because Poles had previously been presented solely as victims, Gross’s book thus 
challenged the dominant post-war historical narrative in Poland.  According to this 
representation of the past, it was ultimately the Nazis—and later the Soviets too, but not until 
communism in Poland came to an end73—who were the real perpetrators of all the war’s carnage.  
They alone were responsible for the unprecedented, nihilistic violence that characterized the war.   
This myth of victimization went beyond the mere belief that many Poles were victims during the 
Second World War.   Contesting that claim would be absurd, of course.  The myth of 
victimization, however, was a nationalist myth that either granted primacy to Polish suffering 
during the war or presented both Polish and Jewish experiences of the Second World War as 
being equivalent.   Gross’s book, by contrast, offered a clear challenge to this Polish claim of 
victimhood.  Indeed, Neighbors ultimately suggested that Poles were not just victims; nor were 
they simply collaborators.  Instead, they were sometimes active, enthusiastic participants in the 
Holocaust.  Neighbors was quite popular in the United States and was even named a finalist for 
the National Book Award.  The reception of Neighbors was much more complex in Poland, 
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however.  This should come as no real surprise given Gross’s challenge to Polish memory.     
Perhaps unsurprisingly, his book led to a firestorm of controversy throughout Poland.    
Debate among Scholars and in the Polish Press  
Before exploring the diverse responses to the Neighbors controversy, it is necessary to 
point out that many scholars have challenged the core ideas and conclusions in Gross’s book.  
For example, many Polish scholars argued that Gross seriously underestimated Nazi participation 
in the destruction of Jedwabne’s Jewish community.  Others questioned whether or not Gross 
oversimplified what happened at Jedwabne and jumped to conclusions based on limited 
evidence.  Perhaps the most serious attack on Gross’s arguments came from Marek Jan 
Chodakiewicz in his book The Massacre in Jedwabne, July 10, 1941: Before, During, After.  
Indeed, Chodakiewicz set out to refute many of Gross’s conclusions and to expose “the many 
methodological and factual weaknesses of Neighbors.”74  Other historians have launched similar 
assaults on Gross and Neighbors.  Bogdan Musiał, for example, attacked Gross’s methodology 
and his use of sources.75     Musiał also doubted the death toll proposed in Neighbors and 
criticized Gross for allegedly being uncritical about the figure he accepted.76   The literature 
debating the merits of Gross’ conclusions is often very polemical, and many authors have gone 
to great lengths to discredit Gross.   Many of these arguments are deeply troublesome.  Tomasz 
Strzembosz, for example, claimed that Gross underestimated the widespread Jewish support for 
the USSR when the Soviets invaded Poland and argued that this should alter the way the events 
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at Jedwabne are remembered.77  Strzembosz was quick to acknowledge that nothing justifies 
mass murder, but his account did present Jews as traitors “who staged a mass welcome for the 
(Red Army) and took part in introducing the new order.”78 Strzembosz may have wanted to 
distance himself from a defense of mass murder, but it is hard to see what point he was making 
by emphasizing Jewish collaboration with the Soviets—unless, of course, his essay is viewed as 
an attempt to minimize the seriousness of the crime against Jedwabne’s Jewish population or as 
an attempt to justify Polish anti-Semitism. Furthermore, as a general rule, when an author has to 
qualify his remarks at the beginning of an essay in order to explicitly reject an act of such 
extreme, deadly brutality, this usually means that what follows is likely to be problematic to say 
the least.   
Many critics responded to Gross’s book with even more vitriol than Strzembosz, 
however.  Antoni Macierewicz, for instance, maintained that Gross had embarked upon a “hate 
campaign” and a “propaganda war” against Poland and Poles with the publication of 
Neighbors.79 Macierewicz also adopted a conspiratorial perspective in his writings on the 
controversy.  Because the Kielce pogrom had been shown—to Macierewicz’s satisfaction at 
least—to have been merely a crime by the NKVD and the UB, i.e. the Soviet and Polish security 
services respectively, he argued that those who hated Poland chose to adopt Jedwabne as the new 
instrument to propagate the “myth” of Polish anti-Semitism.80  This conspiratorial perspective 
was also endorsed, for example, by the aforementioned Cardinal Józef Glemp, who even 
suggested that someone had ordered Gross to write and publish Neighbors.81  Ultimately, 
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Macierewicz’s interpretation suggested that Gross and his supporters were nothing more than 
anti-Polish cynics who were willing to use any tool possible to discredit Polish history.  Others, 
such as Ryszard Bender and Jerzy Robert Nowak, also responded to the controversy with quite 
radical views.82  Though it is crucial to distinguish between Gross’s critics, many authors 
displayed anti-Semitic arguments and rhetoric in their responses to Neighbors—even many of 
those who have acknowledged some degree of Polish participation in the Jedwabne pogrom.83 
It is necessary to point out that there were also more balanced, diplomatic responses 
offered to Neighbors.  A good example of this can be found in Dariusz Stola’s essay “Jedwabne: 
How was it Possible?”  Pointing out that the discipline of history routinely makes progress on the 
basis of revision and argument, Stola praised Gross for setting in motion a new discussion on 
Polish-Jewish relations and the Jedwabne pogrom.84  With that said, Stola recognized that there 
are legitimate questions raised by Gross’s critics; nevertheless, those critics cannot simply 
dismiss Gross’s contribution to the discussion over Poland’s past.85  Ultimately, it was necessary 
to balance some of the more antagonistic, inflammatory responses with more open and honest 
analyses.  Since this has now happened, a deeper dialogue among scholars and a better 
understanding of the significance of the revelations provided by Gross is now possible.  As 
Polonsky and Michlic have pointed out, articles such as Stola’s reflect a shift in the tone in which 
these debates have taken place.86  This is largely the result of a tremendous awareness of 
Jedwabne and the Neighbors controversy among Polish historians and other scholars. The 
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academic discussion over Jedwabne, ultimately, has progressed considerably since the 
publication Gross’s book in 2000. 
There were also many scholars and journalists who more or less sided with Gross against 
his critics and stressed the importance of understanding Gross’s revelations.  Consider, for 
instance, the response offered by Jan Nowak- Jeziorański, a prominent émigré Polish journalist, 
war hero, and former chief of the Polish desk at Radio Free Europe, in his article “A Need for 
Compensation.”  Nowak-Jeziorański argued that much of what was initially debated was 
misguided on some level.  The central issue, he maintained, is not the motivation of those who 
slaughtered Jedwabne’s Jews, or whether Gross had misread his sources, left out important 
information, or overestimated the number of individuals killed.  On the contrary, the essential 
point was the “undeniable fact that old people and children, men and women, were murdered in 
Jedwabne in an unbelievably brutal manner at the hands of Poles.”87  Nowak-Jeziorański then 
proclaimed, “Attempts to undermine this fundamental assertion are, in light of the evidence 
presented, nothing but a denial of the truth.”88    
These are undoubtedly interesting claims.  If Nowak-Jeziorański is correct, these 
statements reveal that much of the existing historiography fails to address satisfactorily Gross’s 
real challenge to Polish national mythology.  Arguably, within the context of memory studies, 
the most interesting part of the Neighbors dispute is its impact on Polish conceptions of history 
and Polish-Jewish relations.  Interestingly, however, Nowak-Jeziorański also expressed concern 
for the impact of Neighbors on Poland’s image abroad, fearing that the book would reinforce 
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stereotypes that all Poles were anti-Semites.89  This captures an important part of much of the 
resistance to Gross’s book, and it also demonstrates that the dispute’s impact on collective 
memory may extend beyond Poland.  The fear, indeed, was that Gross’s account presented a 
damning portrayal of Poland that would mislead outsiders.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, for many 
authors this led to a rejection of Gross’s work.  Much of the dispute’s intensity, as Nowak-
Jeziorański helped to elucidate, was thus largely connected to Neighbors being perceived as an 
attack on Polish national pride—especially by those on the political right. 
Another fascinating article to consider is Jerzy Sławomir Mac’s “Homo Jedvabicus” 
published in 2001.  Mac used the term Homo Jedvabicus to refer to those who did not want to 
confront the unpleasant truths about the Jedwabne massacre that Gross had brought to the 
forefront.  Such individuals, Mac argued, were characterized by “spinelessness, hypocrisy, an 
ostrich-like inclination to stick one’s head in the sand, a hysterical fear of unpleasant truths, and 
an inability to cope with the challenge of shattering the myths of Poles as suffering and heroic 
during the Second World War.”90   This is, of course, a harsh assessment, but it suggests just how 
high the stakes truly were in Mac’s mind.  Mac additionally argued that there was a new 
metaphorical Polish inferno, which could be conceived as a threat to Poland’s reputation and its 
relationship with Jews, that the Homo Jedvabicus was indifferent toward.91  Once again, this 
shows the morally charged nature of the Neighbors controversy.  This was, indeed, an issue that 
captured people’s attention and required urgent public discussion.  It was not merely an 
academic dispute but one that touched upon themes relevant to Polish collective memory and 
national responsibility much more generally.   
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An article published by the Polish sociologist Hanna Świda-Ziemba also sought to 
explore some of the implications of Neighbors.  For Świda-Ziemba, indeed, much like for 
Nowak-Jeziorański, a number of the key elements that appeared early on in the debate were 
simply not all that important.  Pinpointing, say, the precise role of the Nazis or figuring out the 
exact number of Poles who participated in the massacre simply could not alter the simple, 
unalterable fact that the crime was committed by the local population.92   She furthermore 
pointed out the important role that prejudice played in instigating the massacre, denying that 
there was a gulf between anti-Semitism and the crime committed at Jedwabne.93   The revelation 
about the slaughter of Jews offered by Gross, moreover, led Świda-Ziemba to conclude that anti-
Semitism was deeply rooted in Polish society.94    
Ultimately, argued Świda-Ziemba, Poland was morally obligated to engage with this 
dark, troublesome episode in Poland’s past.  In the aftermath of Neighbors, Polish anti-Semitism 
would have to be viewed through the prism of Jedwabne, which would demonstrate the danger of 
anti-Semitism if it went ignored.  Additionally, she maintained, the Sejm—i.e., the Polish 
parliament—ought to unambiguously condemn the massacre, and she argued that the “shock” of 
Jedwabne had the potential to present a new kind of “self-knowledge.”95   This shows that, even 
very early on, observers were taking note of the importance of the Neighbors controversy and its 
potential to reshape Polish-Jewish relations.  It is worth pointing out also that Świda-Ziemba 
understood that this self-knowledge and overturning of the myths of the past would not have 
been possible without Gross’s book.  That is not to say that Neighbors somehow made the 
reshaping of Polish memory inevitable.  Instead, the point is that this was a key moment in 
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Polish history, barely a decade after the collapse of communism, in which the myths of Poland’s 
past could be openly questioned.  Gross’s Neighbors thus came at the right time with the right 
message. 
Official Commemoration  
 Compared to the earlier battles in the Memory Wars, the Neighbors controversy 
engendered the most significant and longest lasting public debate.  It was so large, in fact, that 
many prominent Polish political figures felt obligated to address the controversy. Perhaps the 
most significant of these statements was the public apology delivered by Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski, the President of Poland from 1995 to 2005, during a ceremony marking the 
sixtieth anniversary of the Jedwabne massacre in 2001.  Of course, it is revealing in itself that an 
anniversary was being held so soon after the publication of Gross’s book and that this 
anniversary included an official apology from a head of state.  For Kwaśniewski it was apparent 
that an egregious crime had been committed against Jedwabne’s Jewish population.  Indeed, 
Kwaśniewski acknowledged that Jedwabne’s Jews were ruthlessly slaughtered.  It is also 
important to recognize that Kwaśniewski expressed no doubt that Poles were involved in this 
slaughter.    Moreover, the debate surrounding the Jedwabne pogrom, Kwaśniewski argued, was 
occurring during an important moment in Polish history and represented a pivotal shift in Polish 
attitudes.  “Today’s Poland,” Kwaśniewski boldly proclaimed, “has the courage to look in the 
eye the truth about the nightmare that darkened one of the chapters of her history.”96    Those 
who deny this past, Kwaśniewski added, lead the nation toward “moral self-destruction.”97    
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From such comments it is more than apparent that in Kwaśniewski’s mind the stakes 
were enormous.  The debate over Jedwabne was not an inconsequential issue confined to 
Poland’s past.  On the contrary, addressing this dark and troublesome history was an urgent and 
immediate problem for Poland in the present.  Gross had revealed that Poles had taken part in a 
terrible crime, and Kwaśniewski felt that an official apology on the sixtieth anniversary of the 
slaughter of Jedwabne’s Jews was morally necessary for Poland’s redemption.   Kwaśniewski 
hoped not just for redemption, however.  He also thought that, through commemoration and an 
honest examination of the past, Jedwabne could “become a place of reconciliation.”98    Thus, 
Kwaśniewski hoped that the discussion of the pogrom could fundamentally reshape Polish-
Jewish relations.  In order for this to happen, however, he noted that one must first accept the 
truth about what really occurred at Jedwabne.  Denying past realities—especially those that are 
extremely upsetting and disturbing—could not be regarded as a viable option for Poland in 
Kwaśniewski’s mind.  The past had to be dealt with.  Only confronting the truth in all its 
unpleasantness, he argued, could allow for the “cleansing of memory’s wound.”99     
It is interesting to note that Kwaśniewski would not be the last Polish President to 
apologize for the Jedwabne massacre.  Just ten years later, during the 70th anniversary of the 
pogrom, Bronisław Komorowski, Poland’s current President, reiterated the sentiments expressed 
by Kwaśniewski and asked the Jews again for their forgiveness.100   It is undoubtedly revealing 
that two Polish presidents over the course of a single decade felt the need to apologize for the 
Jedwabne pogrom.  This is a testament to the impact of the debate provoked by Gross and the 
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extra symbolic weight that the issue has taken on.  Furthermore, this suggests a serious 
commitment on the part of the Polish state to overcome the country’s troublesome past.  Rather 
than ignore or marginalize the issue, the Polish government has felt pressured to confront the 
country’s history in a very direct manner on at least two separate occasions.   
Another important political figure who offered an interesting statement on the 
controversy surrounding Jedwabne is Władysław Bartoszewski, the aforementioned former 
Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs and a former Auschwitz survivor himself who had been 
arrested by the Germans during the war for his resistance activities, which included the 
organization of aid to Jews seeking to escape Nazi persecution.  Indeed, Bartoszewski delivered 
a speech at the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC on April 5, 2001, announcing 
that his country could attain “moral greatness” through confronting the past.101   In order to 
achieve this, argued Bartoszewski, Poland would have to follow the model set by the United 
States with regard to its role in Vietnam and deal with its past extensively through films, books 
and other media.  This is precisely why, claimed Bartoszewski, the United States is “a great 
country.”102   Of course, it is very much debatable in what sense—and for what reason—the 
United States ought to be considered a “great country.”  Moreover, one could question how 
seriously Vietnam has really been dealt with in American popular culture.  Indeed, many of the 
films and books produced in the United States on Vietnam, Bartoszewski’s hypothetical 
interlocutor could argue, might actually serve other purposes.   
Regardless of where one stands on those kinds of issues, Bartoszewski’s point is 
interesting precisely because he identifies a reflective approach to history and a capacity for self-
                                                          
101 “Address Delivered by Władysław Bartoszewski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Holocaust 




criticism as being essential traits for Poland moving forward.  During the communist era, of 
course, this was not possible.103  The version of history put forward by the state simply could not 
be openly challenged without facing potentially serious consequences.  At the same time, the 
myths of resistance and heroism that obscured the troublesome story of Polish-Jewish relations 
went unchallenged.  Thus, in many ways, Gross’s book—and the ensuing debate it spawned—
was representative of an important part of the transition from a communist to a post-communist 
society.  Furthermore, it is interesting to note, with the release of films like Pokłosie and Ida, that 
perhaps Bartoszewski’s hope is coming true.  It remains to be seen, however, how many 
additional films and other artistic projects will be made, and the question of whether or not they 
will be successful in addressing the Polish-Jewish past in a serious, meaningful way is still very 
much an open question. 
The former Prime Minister of Poland, Jerzy Buzek, also addressed the slaughter of 
Jedwabne’s Jews in the aftermath of Neighbors.  Buzek noted that “the participation of Poles in 
the crime in Jedwabne is indisputable; it isn’t questioned by any respectable historian.”104   This 
is, of course, true.  While many scholars attacked Gross and Neighbors, it was not possible to 
seriously deny Polish participation in the pogrom, a conclusion which would be even further 
bolstered by the Institute of National Memory’s study on the Jedwabne massacre.105   Buzek 
went on to claim the following: “We are ready to confront even the darkest facts of our history, 
but in the spirit of truth—without seeking presumed justifications.”106   With that said, however, 
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Buzek expressed more reservation than either Bartoszewski or Kwaśniewski.  He pointed out, for 
instance, that Poland was an occupied country during the pogrom and that the slaughter was “not 
committed in the name of the nation, or in the name of the Polish state.”107   While that was 
undeniably true, Buzek’s defensive posture failed to deal with the historical presence of anti-
Semitism in Poland.  This captures some of the underlying tension in the Polish response to 
Gross’s revelations about Jedwabne. 
It would be absurd to suggest that there is some kind of unified Polish memory of 
Jedwabne.  As Benedict Anderson famously theorized, nations are simply imagined 
communities, and it is far from obvious that there is much more holding nations together than 
imagination.  There is, of course, no single unified Polish psychology, and thus there is not a sole 
authoritative Polish interpretation of any historical event.  Naturally, indeed, if there were not 
many Poles who disagreed with many of the sentiments outlined above there could not have been 
such a large, polemical debate.  To take one example, consider the view expressed by Lech 
Wałęsa: “The Jedwabne crime was a revenge for the cooperation of the Jewish community with 
the Soviet occupant.  The Poles have already apologized many times to the Jews; we are waiting 
for the apology from the other side because many Jews were scoundrels.”108   Of course, this 
inflammatory statement demonstrates that there certainly was no consensus among prominent 
Polish political figures on how to respond to the Jedwabne massacre, and it additionally serves as 
a good example of the sometimes fierce response by those who wanted to cling to the older 
myths of Polish history.   
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It is also revealing that the monument dedicated to the Jewish victims of Jedwabne has 
been the subject of vandalism.  For example, in 2011 graffiti was added to the monument with 
phrases like “I do not apologize for Jedwabne” and “They were flammable.”109   Once again, this 
powerfully illustrates the extremely divisive nature of the memory of the Jedwabne massacre—
especially toward the stances taken publicly by the Polish government.  Unsurprisingly, given his 
apparent commitment to confront this troubled past, Komorowski condemned this act of 
vandalism.110   All of this, to reiterate, serves as a good case study in documenting the often 
heated nature of the dispute and the importance of its discussion for Polish memory.  
Furthermore, it helps to show that Poles have had diverse responses to the Neighbors 
controversy, and it would be a gross oversimplification to try to present a single, coherent 
response to the debate over the Jedwabne pogrom.  With that said, however, it is certainly worth 
pointing out that these vandals were likely supported by a relatively small percentage of the 
Polish population, and it would be wise not to exaggerate the meaning of this incident.  Still, it is 
undoubtedly a disturbing episode, and it is powerful evidence that anti-Semitism is still very 
much alive in Poland today—even if it reveals little about how prevalent anti-Semitism is 
throughout Polish society. 
Nonetheless, there are certain facts that the official political response to the Neighbors 
controversy sheds light on.  For example, it is apparent that in the wake of Gross’s challenge to 
Polish national memory the government largely adopted a tone of apology toward Jews.  This 
was by no means accepted by everyone within the Polish state, yet it is clear that the Polish 
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government made a meaningful effort to confront the demons of history in a serious, deliberate 
manner.  Because the Polish state is both a literal and symbolic representative of the Polish 
people, this response marked a significant moment in Poland’s attempt to engage with its history, 
i.e., in the process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung.111  The government’s response also represents 
an important part of the process of reframing Polish-Jewish relations.   Given the virtual absence 
of the Jewish community in contemporary Poland, moreover, these issues needed a book like 
Neighbors to be brought to the public’s attention.   
Artistic Commemoration  
The complex and confused response to the Jedwabne pogrom is also evident in some of 
the artistic commemoration that has appeared in the aftermath of the Neighbors controversy.  
Consider, for example, the aforementioned film Pokłosie, which was released in 2012 and is 
among the best examples of this phenomenon.  This film, much like Gross’s book, proved to be 
extremely controversial.  Written and directed by Władysław Pasikowski, Pokłosie tells the story 
of two brothers.  The film begins when the elder brother, Franciszek Kalina, who is played by 
Ireneusz Czop, returns to his hometown in Poland after a prolonged absence, which he spent as 
an immigrant in Chicago.  Upon his return, Franciszek is shocked to discover that his brother, 
Józek Kalina, who is played by Maciej Stuhr, has become something of a pariah in the town.  
This is due to Józek’s attempt to reconstruct a Jewish cemetery.  Indeed, after discovering that 
the tombstones of the town’s Jewish inhabitants had been scattered during the Second World 
War, Józef begins to collect the tombstones—sometimes at great personal expense—and rebuild 
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the town’s Jewish cemetery.  The townspeople, however, are infuriated by these actions.  Józek 
is badly beaten up by several men at one point, and Franciszek is constantly threatened 
throughout the film as well.  It is then revealed that many of the townspeople directly benefited 
from the extermination of the town’s Jewish population.  In fact, the two brothers are shocked to 
discover that their own farm had been illegitimately acquired from a Jewish family that had been 
eliminated during the Holocaust, but even this is not the full story.  
  The film’s final twist becomes clear when the two brothers discover that the town’s 
Jewish inhabitants were not killed by Nazis.  On the contrary, the town’s Jews were collectively 
forced into the Kalina family’s barn and burned alive by their neighbors.  Even more devastating 
for the brothers, it is revealed that their own father participated in this massacre and even helped 
set fire to the building.  This revelation proves too much for Józek, who become convinced that 
covering up the atrocity is necessary.  Their only option, Józek reasons, is to secretly rebury the 
bones in the mass grave that the two brothers had found on their family’s original property.  The 
shame is too great, and if brought to the public’s attention it will lead to an embarrassment for 
his family, the town and even the entire Polish nation.  Franciszek, however, argues that that the 
two brothers need to expose the crime and rebury the bones in their new cemetery.  Franciszek 
finally wins the argument when he boldly claims, “This world is a lousy shithole.  And we won’t 
make it one bit better, but you know what?  We won’t make it worse.  And that’s something.”112   
Here it is evident that Franciszek understands that, echoing some of the sentiments from 
Kwaśniewski’s speech, the crime cannot be undone, but it is not too late for the brothers to do 
what is necessary—even if it embarrasses themselves, their community and the entire nation.  
Following Józek’s brutal death at the hands of townspeople, the bones are reburied, and the film 
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ends with Franciszek paying his respects to the town’s murdered Jews while a rabbi, who is 
accompanied by many Jewish mourners, performs a funeral ceremony for the town’s murdered 
Jews.  The truth has at last come out. 
In many ways this film symbolizes a number of the key issues brought to the forefront by 
Gross’s book.  It is undoubtedly important that Józek has to die.  Indeed, in the end Józek wants 
to cover up the past, to obscure this dark and embarrassing chapter of his family’s history.  The 
bones, which he wants to stay hidden, serve as a larger metaphor.  To conceal them is to both 
literally and figuratively conceal the past, which is necessitated in his mind by the disturbing 
secrets that he and his brother had uncovered.  It is only once this mentality dies, moreover, that 
the truth can surface, making reconciliation possible.  While the film does not proclaim that 
Polish-Jewish reconciliation has been achieved, the possibility is strongly suggested.  The Jews 
are able to mourn their deceased properly once the bones are buried in the Kalina cemetery and 
Franciszek watches them from afar, perhaps making peace with his own connection to the 
massacre.  It is significant, however, that he appears to be the only non-Jew at the ceremony.  
The rest of the town, it appears, is still reluctant to embrace the town’s true history.   This is 
reminiscent of the actual town of Jedwabne.  For instance, one ought to note that the majority of 
Jedwabne’s population opted to boycott the sixtieth anniversary ceremony of the slaughter.113   
While many Poles have been able to accept what transpired at Jedwabne in 1941, acknowledging 
this tragic truth has been especially difficult for the inhabitants of Jedwabne, who—like 
Franciszek and Józek—have a very close connection to the pogrom.   
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During the communist era, of course, when officially promoted myths of the Second 
World War were much harder to criticize, films which dealt with Polish-Jewish relations were a 
rarity.114   Furthermore, in those few films which did address these issues, in the words of Marek 
Haltof, “History is presented either as a nightmare everybody would like to forget or as an 
almost nostalgic picture stressing the multinational character of prewar Poland.”115  Pokłosie, of 
course, does not fit into either model, offering neither a nostalgic nor romanticized view of the 
past.  On the contrary, Pokłosie exposes a dark chapter in Polish history, revealing the murderous 
extent of Polish anti-Semitism.  Even the film’s main hero, Franciszek, displays anti-Semitic 
tendencies when, on several occasions, he expresses his dislike for Chicago’s Jewish population.  
Moreover, the rest of the town’s extensive anti-Semitism is on display throughout the film, as the 
townspeople routinely do everything in their power to prevent the two brothers from discovering 
the truth—often through violent means.  Returning to the first model outlined by Haltof, it is also 
evident that this is no nightmare to forget.  Instead, the film suggests, this is a nightmare that 
must be remembered.  Pokłosie thus depicts Polish-Jewish relations in a novel way and is clearly 
inspired by Neighbors.    Just as the two brothers must come to terms with the past, the film 
implies, so too must Poland come to terms with Jedwabne.   
Ultimately, Pokłosie is a continuation of the Neighbors controversy, and it is a film that is 
very transparently framed by Gross’s book.  It also attracted tremendous controversy, which 
helps to further reveal something about the highly contested nature of Polish collective memory 
on these issues.  In an interview the historian Bogdan Musiał, who of course is one of the best 
known critics of Neighbors, argued that Pokłosie perpetuated falsehoods found in Gross’s work 
                                                          
114 Marek Haltof, “National Memory, the Holocaust, and Images of the Jew in Postwar Polish Films” in 
Polish National Cinema (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 222. 
115 Ibid, 239. 
Bergquist 45 
 
and that the film presented Poles as a “dangerous mob.”116  Musiał, in that same interview, even 
went so far as to suggest that the progressive thinking behind the film had its roots in Stalinism.   
Furthermore, another previously mentioned critic of Neighbors, Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, also 
attacked the film extensively in an interview.117    Indeed, Chodakiewicz alleged that Pokłosie is 
an attempt to manipulate the Holocaust and make Poles feel ashamed of their heritage.  Similar 
to Musiał’s analysis, Chodakiewicz’s criticism clearly has political undertones, and there is an 
obvious fear that the representations of history offered by both Neighbors and Pokłosie are a 
threat to Polish national memory.    
Another fascinating and revealing example of artistic commemoration is evident in Rafał 
Betlejewski’s act of symbolically burning a barn.  This incident is documented in a short film 
Betlejewski produced titled Płonie Stodoła.118   Essentially, Betlejewski erected a barn in the 
village of Zawada, and then he subsequently incinerated this barn.  Moreover, small sheets of 
paper, which symbolized Poles taking the place of the murdered Jews of Jedwabne, were left 
scattered across the floor as Betlejewski set fire to the barn.  Like the reception of Neighbors, 
which Betlejewski admitted had inspired this action, the responses to this act were both 
conflicted and confusing.  A surprisingly large number of spectators turned up at the event, and 
two young males, arguing that Betlejewski’s act “trivializes and devalues the symbols of the 
Holocaust,”119 decided to protest the event by refusing to leave the barn.  The two protestors only 
left after being physically threatened by spectators who wanted to watch the barn burn.   One 
commentator, Maria Antonia Szpunar, argued that Betlejewski was “turning Jedwabne into a 
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circus.”120   Zuzanna Marczynska expressed an entirely different concern: “Rafał, don’t burn this 
barn.  You mustn’t!  Think about the citizens of Jedwabne.  This barn will painfully mark them 
again with the guilt of this crime.”121   One final commentator, wishing to remain anonymous, 
argued that Betlejewski had no right to speak for the Polish people.   In many ways, 
Betlejewski’s action functions as a microcosm of the larger debate over the memory of 
Jedwabne.  Indeed, the responses were extremely diverse and—in some cases—very angry.  The 
purpose of Betlejewski’s action, to symbolically burn up the person he was prior to his 
understanding of Jedwabne and its importance for Polish-Jewish relations, aligns very nicely 
with Gross’s determination to overturn the myths of Poland’s past.  Furthermore, this incident 
demonstrates a strong desire to take responsibility for the past, which is practically demanded by 
Gross’s work.   
Another attempt to commemorate Jedwabne artistically can be seen in Eva Hoffman’s 
play The Ceremony.  Hoffman hoped that her play would “act as a kind of ceremony, an 
enactment of communal conflict, mourning, and atonement and ultimately of a difficult, 
chastening exorcism.”122   Her play, moreover, adequately captures a number of the diverse 
responses to Gross’s revelations about the horrors that transpired at Jedwabne in 1941.  For 
instance, in one scene there are two men who converse with a blacksmith.  Over the course of 
their conversation it becomes apparent that they actually miss the Jews—even though it is 
implied that they took part in the massacre.123   This same theme, a yearning for the Jews to 
return to Poland, is also eloquently on display in Yael Bartana’s film, Koszmary or Nightmares, 
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the first of Bartana’s so-called Polish trilogy, in which Sławomir Sierakowski offers an 
impassioned plea for three million Jews to return to Poland and once again live alongside their 
Polish neighbors.124 It is significant to note that this scene was staged in the old Warsaw soccer 
stadium, which was built in part from the ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto.  This stadium would later 
be demolished to make way for the construction of Warsaw’s new stadium prior to the 2012 
European Cup. 
Returning to Hoffman, however, there is another scene in The Ceremony in which a host 
of individuals—some inhabitants of Jedwabne, others who have come from afar—listen to the 
President’s apology speech.  The reaction is mixed.  One spectator, for example, Piotr, regards 
the speech as “redeeming our Polish soul.”125   Rachel, a Jew from Baltimore whose 
grandparents were from Jedwabne, rejects this explanation: “What a concept! You think an 
apology is… enough?! After everything that has happened here?”126   The meaning of the 
president’s apology—and especially its moral significance—is highly contested in the play.  This 
is, of course, consistent with the response to Kwaśniewski’s actual apology speech.  Still, 
arguably the most important thing here is the recognition that something horrible happened and 
the struggle over how to interpret this uncomfortable truth.  Though the proper response to the 
memory of this event being unearthed is unclear, much of the debate and ambiguity rests with 
the issue of responsibility.  Piotr, indeed, annoyed by Rachel’s accusations, claims, “You, you, 
who do you think you’re speaking to?  Do you think I did those things?”127   The nature of moral 
responsibility—especially as it relates to collective responsibility—is a vexing philosophical 
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issue that Hoffman does not attempt to resolve in her play.  With that said, it is particularly 
illuminating that The Ceremony attempts to address such questions.  Hoffman’s play ultimately 
takes on the difficult task of engaging history—just like Pokłosie, Koszmary or Płonie Stodoła—
and is thus an important example of the recent post-Neighbors attempt to address the complex 
issue of Polish-Jewish relations through artistic media.   
Of course, this discussion cannot be complete without analyzing the most recent effort to 
address the Polish-Jewish past through film, namely, Paweł Pawlikowski 2013 award-winning 
drama Ida.  Much like Pokłosie, Pawlikowski’s film focuses on the issue of a disturbing history 
coming to light.  The film’s protagonist, Ida, played by Agata Trzebuchowska, is a Catholic 
novice on the verge of becoming a nun.  Before fully joining the convent, Ida is introduced to her 
only living relative: her aunt Wanda Gruz, a communist judge who earned the nickname “Red 
Wanda” in the 1950s due to her apparent zeal and ruthlessness.  Wanda, played by Agata 
Kulesza, reveals to Ida her secret Jewish lineage.  The revelation that Ida is actually a Jewish nun 
proves quite shocking for the young novice, which prompts both her and Wanda to search for 
answers about what became of her parents during the war.  Their inquiries into the fate of Ida’s 
family prove difficult, but eventually Wanda and Ida discover the truth: Ida’s parents were 
ruthlessly murdered and their bones were buried in the forest.  Ida’s parents, the Lebensteins, 
were apparently killed by the Skiba family who hid the Lebensteins during the early stages of the 
Nazi occupation.  They then stole Ida’s parents’ home, which is now occupied by the family of 
Feliks Skiba.  In exchange for renouncing her claim to her parents’ home, Feliks promises to take 
Ida and Wanda into the forest where the bones are buried, an offer which Ida has no choice but to 
accept.  There they discover what’s left of Ida’s parents and Wanda’s young son, who was also 
in hiding with Ida’s family.  The grim discovery proves too much for Wanda, who eventually 
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kills herself toward the end of the film.  Ida wonders why she also was not buried in the shallow 
grave, and Felix reveals that unlike Wanda’s son—who had a dark complexion and had been 
circumcised—she could pass for a Pole, so she escaped the rest of her family’s fate and was 
abandoned at an orphanage.   
The unearthing of the bones of Ida’s family is a powerful metaphor for the unearthing of 
the history of Polish crimes during the Holocaust.  Just as the Kalina brothers are forced to 
wrestle with the question of how to respond to the dark secrets they uncover, so too must both 
Ida and Wanda.  After the two women rebury the bones at a Jewish cemetery, Ida’s entire 
identity is left completely shattered.  She is seen consuming alcohol and even sleeps with a man, 
a clear violation of her vows.  With her identity in tatters, Ida now seems out of place at the 
convent.  While she does not choose death like her aunt, the purpose of Ida’s life is profoundly 
shaken and her future as a nun is left unclear by Pawlikowski.  Additionally, it is worth noting 
that the central crime of the film—namely, the murder of Ida’s family by Feliks Skiba—is left 
ambiguous and only partially explained.  Perhaps Feliks murdered the Jews he was hiding out of 
a misplaced desire to protect his family, but it seems more likely that he had anti-Semitic 
motivations. Perhaps he bought into the myth of the greedy Jew and simply wanted to steal the 
family’s property.128 
Ultimately, Ida is a very good film, a conclusion shared by many critics around the 
world, which is further bolstered by the numerous awards it has won—including the 2015 
Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film and the 2014 European Film Award for Best 
Film.  The film’s cinematography is undoubtedly excellent.   Ida’s quest to discover the fate of 
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her family is set against a haunting black-and-white backdrop.  What is particularly haunting, 
however, is not just what is shown; it is also what Pawlikowski chooses not to show—e.g. the 
bones of Ida’s family.  Instead, the viewer often experiences the horrors of the film by witnessing 
the emotions and expressions of the film’s main characters directly.  Perhaps equally haunting, 
however, is the film’s reliance on silent reflection.  As Jeremy Hicks has been pointed out, 
Pawlikowski has a deep sensitivity to the unsayable129, which is constantly on display in Ida, a 
film that does not need to rely upon dialogue to convey emotion and meaning.  Moreover, this 
reliance upon silence resonates nicely with the often unspeakably traumatic nature of the 
memory of the Holocaust in Poland. 
The reception of Ida in Poland was probably better than that of Pokłosie.  Indeed, many 
Poles responded to Pawlikowski’s film quite favorably, and Ida won numerous awards in 
Poland—including the Polish Film Academy’s awards for Best Film, Best Actress, Best Director 
and Best Editing.130    Nevertheless, as is almost always the case when the history of Polish Jews 
is brought up in Poland, the film also inspired controversy.  Recently the Polish anti-Defamation 
League, for example, launched a campaign to condemn Pawlikowski’s film, which resulted in 
numerous signatures by Polish right-wing nationalists.131  This petition, which demands that Ida 
include a number of disclaimers acknowledging the Nazi occupation and culpability for the 
Holocaust and Poland’s many heroic efforts to save Jewish lives, has now been signed by more 
than 50,000 individuals.132 Tadeusz Płużański, moreover, maintains that Ida, despite its artistic 
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value, continues the alleged misrepresentations and “anti-Polish tone” found in Gross’s work and 
Pokłosie.133  Pawlikowski’s film, finally, has even been described as “anti-Polish propaganda 
disguised as art.”134  Ultimately, the film’s presentation of history remains highly contested, and 
it is evident that Ida has once again posed a significant challenge to the national memory of the 
Polish-Jewish past. 
Now it is necessary to return to the question that naturally arises out of Bartoszewski’s 
2001 speech, i.e., how successful have these attempts at artistic commemoration been at 
addressing these issues in a serious, meaningful way?  Purely on an intellectual level, these 
works have clearly succeeded in engaging with Gross’s revelations about the Jedwabne massacre 
in a nuanced way.  In the end, it is apparent that these works of art are an important part of 
Poland’s attempt to deal with its past.  Just as many Polish politicians stepped up and addressed 
the controversy, so too have Polish artists and filmmakers.  While the average Pole may not 
necessarily be familiar with all of these works, it is nevertheless symbolically important that 
these issues have been addressed through various artistic media.  Furthermore, these artistic 
developments are representative of larger shifts occurring within Poland—shifts which are part 
of a broader, cumulative process that is altering Polish conceptions of history and helping to 
reshape Polish-Jewish relations. 
 
 
                                                          
133 Tadeusz Płużański, “Nowe Pokłosie,” last modified January 7, 2015, http://niezalezna.pl/63018-nowe-
poklosie 




Chapter Four: Other Works by Gross 
 Neighbors ultimately presented a profound challenge to Polish collective memory.  By 
undermining Polish myths of heroism and victimization during the Second World War, Gross’s 
book brought to the forefront a novel way of assessing Poland’s wartime history, which had 
important implications for Polish-Jewish relations.  Of course, while they were certainly a small 
minority, many Poles really did act heroically during the war, and that history has been well-
documented.135  Additionally, Poles suffered traumatic devastation—in material, physical and 
psychological terms—during the Second World War.  Neither of these histories can or should be 
denied.  With that said, Gross helped to show that there was more to Polish wartime history than 
these experiences.  Within Poland, indeed, there is an undeniable history of anti-Semitism, and it 
is crucial to assess this history and to try to understand the memory politics that sought to 
marginalize or distort it.    
 Gross’s book was not the first to address the vexing topic of Polish-Jewish relations in a 
provocative way, and it is important not to overstate the role of Gross and Neighbors in the 
Memory Wars and the reframing of Polish-Jewish relations.  Instead, this is the result of a large 
and collaborative process, which began as the communist era was coming to a close and is still 
very much ongoing.  Perhaps the best book on the subject that predated Gross is Michael 
Steinlauf’s Bondage to the Dead: Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust.  Steinlauf, who like 
Gross is of Polish-Jewish ancestry, documents the experience of Polish Jews during the Second 
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World War, and he also rigorously analyzes the construction of Holocaust memory in Poland.136  
But ultimately, it was Neighbors that really brought the discussion to a level of public scrutiny 
that had never been possible before. In part, this was because Neighbors was originally published 
in Polish and aimed at a Polish audience, while Steinlauf’s book was aimed at an English-
speaking audience. For this reason the publication of Neighbors is a crucial moment in the 
Memory Wars—and quite possibly the most important moment—and this explains why Gross 
requires so much attention in this analysis. 
 Still, to understand the challenges posed by Gross’s research it is necessary to go beyond 
Neighbors.  Indeed, Gross did not simply leave the discussion to Polish scholars and journalists 
after his groundbreaking work on the Jedwabne pogrom.  Since the publication of Neighbors, 
Gross has written two additional books—namely, Fear and Golden Harvest—that continue his 
assault on Polish national mythology.  In order to understand Gross’s place in the Memory Wars, 
it is necessary to incorporate these works into the discussion and evaluate how they contributed 
to the debates on Polish-Jewish relations; similarly, one must also assess the responses elicited 
by these works.   
Fear Controversy 
 Fear was published in 2007.  Unlike Gross’s earlier work Neighbors, it was first released 
in the United States; thus, even before the Polish version’s publication, the book was under 
attack—particularly by the Polish-Catholic press—and characterized as “deceitful” and “anti-
Polish.”137  Furthermore, Fear did not provide a revolutionary account of a topic within Polish 
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historiography.138  There was no need, indeed, for the kind of radical revisionist history that 
Jedwabne required.  On the contrary, the arguments and conclusions in Fear did not rest upon 
any new historical evidence, and thus it was much harder for critics to attack Gross’s handling of 
the facts.139  Much like Neighbors, however, the response to Fear was quite diverse and very 
polemical.  Gross’s supporters viewed this work as a welcome addition to the growing literature 
that reassessed the history of Polish Jews.  Many of Gross’s critics, however, continued to react 
harshly and with much vitriol.   
In Fear, Gross reveals the story of Poland’s surviving Jews in the aftermath of the 
Second World War and the Holocaust.  Even after liberation from Nazi rule, Polish Jews 
suffered tremendously.  Taking a special place in Gross’s book is the Kielce pogrom, which was 
the deadliest peacetime pogrom in twentieth-century Europe.  Essentially, Gross attempts to 
engage with the question of how this sort of massacre was possible following the Third Reich’s 
defeat.  Why, Gross asks, might even those responsible for saving Jewish lives during WWII—
the so-called Righteous Among the Nations—fear that their heroic actions would become known 
throughout their communities?  And what sort of factors, ultimately, contributed to this deeply 
anti-Semitic atmosphere in postwar Poland?   
One of Gross’s most interesting points concerns the opportunistic nature of many of the 
Polish wartime crimes committed against Jews.  Gross points out, for example, that a vast 
amount of Jewish wealth was plundered by both Poles and Nazis.  Moreover, this experience was 
common throughout the Holocaust and its aftermath, an issue Gross explores in much greater 
depth in Golden Harvest.  Jews, rather disturbingly, became something like a commodity or 
                                                          
138 For an earlier discussion of the Kielce pogrom, see Bożena Szaynok, Pogrom Żydów w Kielcach, 4 lipca 
1946 r. (Warsaw: Bellona, 1992). 
139 Forecki, 216. 
Bergquist 55 
 
resource needed to be harvested during this time.  Nothing was off limits in this avaricious quest 
for wealth.  Jewish graves, indeed, were routinely plundered in the hopes of finding something of 
value that others might have missed.  Furthermore, there was also a sense that Poles were entitled 
to Jewish possessions and property.  In the minds of the perpetrators of these heinous deeds, the 
wealth accumulated by Jews was fair game and this harvest needed to be fiercely guarded from 
outsiders.  Gross recounts one story in which Poles from Wąsosz arrived in Radziłów to take part 
in the slaughter of Jews.  Because they were seen as being from too far away, these men were 
chased away, but Poles arriving from Konopki, a much closer town, were allowed to take part in 
the slaughter and subsequent harvest.  “Evidently,” Gross declares, “a town’s Jews were for the 
town’s people to plunder.”140 
Gross documents post-war pogroms in Kraków and Kielce—with a particular emphasis 
on the latter.  The perpetrators of these atrocities were motivated, at least on the surface, by the 
anti-Semitic belief that children were being kidnapped and ritually murdered by Jews.   Another 
notion that helped to fuel this violence was the belief that Jews were in some sense deeply 
connected with communism, the myth of żydokomuna. It was this belief, Gross notes, that 
prompted Catholic hierarchs to claim that “the Jews were Communists and that they brought all 
their misfortunes upon themselves.”141   But why and how did such an atrocity occur?  Gross 
argues that there was nothing particularly unique about Kielce.  Indeed, the pogrom could have 
occurred anywhere throughout Poland.  Gross additionally criticizes the provocation hypothesis, 
or prowokacja, of the Kielce pogrom.  This is the thesis that the communists, perhaps with the 
aid of Jews hoping to engender a Jewish departure en masse to Israel, intentionally brought about 
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the Kielce slaughter.  For Gross, however, there is “no material evidence to support such a 
scenario.”142  Returning to the issue of żydokomuna, Gross naturally sets out to disabuse his 
readers of this notion.  While Gross concedes that Jews were disproportionately involved in 
communist or socialist movements, he makes it clear that this is because Jews had no other 
viable political options.  They were simply not welcome anywhere else.  Ultimately, Gross 
declares, Jews did not force communism on Polish society.  On the contrary, Gross argues for 
precisely the opposite conclusion, i.e., communism was forced on Poland’s Jews by the anti-
Semitism that characterized Polish society.  Moreover, the communist government that emerged 
in the aftermath of the Second World War chose to adopt an approach that Gross describes as 
“not very benign neglect with respect to the ‘Jewish problem.’”143    
Ultimately, Gross does not offer a simple diagnosis for the outburst of anti-Semitic 
violence in the aftermath of WWII in Fear.  The reasons are nuanced and multicausal.  Greed 
has already been noted; anti-Semitism, indeed, had the potential to be quite profitable for those 
willing to partake in the golden harvest, but there was much more to it than that.  Because the 
Jews had been victimized by their Polish neighbors during the Holocaust, Gross asserts, their 
survival represented something disturbing in the minds of Poles—something that was not 
tolerable.   It was thus what the Poles had done to the Jews, and not what the Jews had done to 
the Poles, which motivated these crimes.  This realization prompts Gross to quote Tacitus, who 
noted that all people “have a propensity to hate those whom they injured.”144    According to 
Gross, it was inevitably easier for Poles to eliminate these surviving Jews—who may have come 
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back for their property or sought redress in other ways for the crimes committed against them—
than to seek harmony, forgiveness or reconciliation. 
Given these profound challenges to Polish memory, it is not surprising that Fear would 
be attacked by many Polish scholars.  For example, Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, who authored a 
book in response to Fear called After the Holocaust, argued in an interview with Rzeczpospolita 
that Fear perpetuated misinformation found in Gross’s earlier work.  More specifically, he 
accused Gross of approaching the debate with a preconceived notion of “universal, bloodthirsty 
Polish anti-Semitism” that distorts his historical writing.145  In addition to arguing that the 
outburst of violence documented in Fear was confined to only a handful of isolated incidents, 
Chodakiewicz attacked Gross for drawing larger conclusions about the extent of anti-Semitism 
across Poland.  Instead, Chodakiewicz maintained, one ought to only speak about individual 
cases.  Furthermore, Chodakiewicz lambasted Gross for his alleged postmodernism and accused 
him of being little more than a propagandist.  Just as in Musiał’s criticism of Pokłosie, 
Chodakiewicz linked Gross’s presentation of Polish crimes against Jews with Stalinism.146  In 
After the Holocaust, moreover, Chodakiewicz does not really reply to Fear directly; instead, he 
attempts to reestablish the narrative of victimization in order to minimize the severity of Gross’s 
arguments.147  For Chodakiewicz and many other scholars, ultimately, it is paramount to defend 
a nationalistic presentation of Polish history that excludes all inconvenient facts.  Any historical 
injustices can only be considered as isolated, individual incidents, and there can be no larger 
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social, political or cultural context within which to discuss these crimes.  Chodakiewicz’s 
presentation of history absolves Poland a priori from the need to confront the past. 
The harsh reaction to Fear was not limited to scholars, however.   Gross’s book was 
considered so insulting and problematic that right-wing legislators actually proposed taking 
serious legal action, which could have resulted in Gross’s arrest.  Indeed, Jerzy Engeling, the 
Public Prosecutor General Deputy, assured these legislators that he would examine the case, but 
fortunately no charges were ultimately pursued.148  In response to the threat of legal action taken 
to silence him, Gross promised to show up in court and fight the charges if any were brought 
against him.  Additionally, Gross pledged to bring witnesses to the stand that would confirm his 
account of events.149  As Piotr Forecki has pointed out, the fact that the Prosecutor’s Office even 
addressed the case helped to discredit and invalidate Fear for many ordinary Poles.  
Furthermore, other institutions—such as the Catholic Church and the Institute of National 
Remembrance—have also played a role in this invalidating process.150 
Golden Harvest Controversy 
 The 2012 publication of Golden Harvest, which Gross wrote with his former wife, Irena 
Grudzińska-Gross, further complicated matters.  As noted previously, in this text Gross 
documents the history of Poles profiting off of the Holocaust.   He begins, indeed, with a 
disturbing photograph, which shows a group of Poles at Treblinka.  Remarkably, these 
individuals, who are seen posing next to a pile of skulls and bones, were purportedly caught 
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digging through piles of ashes in search of Jewish valuables just before the photo was taken.151 
Not all of the individuals who participated in the golden harvest would dig through the ashes of 
the dead in the hopes of finding some treasure overlooked by the Nazis, of course.  Gross argues 
instead that the process of enriching oneself at the expense of Jewish lives was quite diversified.  
For instance, it often happened as a result of ordinary transactions between individuals, in which 
Jews would give Poles their valuables for safekeeping.152  But all too frequently, Gross alleges, 
Poles would violate these agreements, keeping the valuables for themselves despite their 
commitments.153  During the war, Jews were hunted like animals by the Germans, and Polish 
peasants would sometimes join in these hunts.  Furthermore, Poles have been documented 
participating in these hunts on their own initiative.154  Another way to participate in the golden 
harvest was simply by charging Jews for shelter during the Holocaust.155  This often involved 
extortion.  If the Jews would or could not pay, they would be handed over to the Nazis.  Given 
the widespread anti-Semitic stereotype of Jews hoarding away vast sums of money, it is not 
difficult to imagine how expensive survival might be, and there was still the threat of being 
turned in—even after making the agreed upon payment.   
 Ultimately, Gross’s thesis in Golden Harvest calls into question many of the same issues 
discussed in both Neighbors and Fear.  Once again, a troublesome history, in which Jews are 
victimized by their Polish neighbors, is brought into the public spotlight.  And once again, a 
large number of critics denounced Gross’s findings.  Marek Jan Chodakiewicz emerged yet again 
as one of Gross’s leading detractors.  Indeed, for Chodakiewicz this work continued Gross’s 
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tendency to “demonize the Poles en masse,” a feat which Gross managed to accomplish by 
ignoring “virtually all empirical and scholarly evidence that contradicts his theories.”156  
Chodakiewicz, moreover, attacked Gross for his use of the photograph—the authenticity of 
which cannot be verified—and his broader methodology.  Gross is guilty of a myriad of logical 
fallacies and his style, says Chodakiewicz, is more like that of a literary critic rather than a 
serious historian.157  Gross even apparently failed to take into consideration basic human 
nature.158  Chodakiewicz, finally, attacked Gross for his emphasis on collective—rather than 
individual—responsibility.  This is a perversion of the nature of moral responsibility, which is 
said to be “mea culpa” rather than “nostra culpa.”159 
 In that same volume addressing Gross, which is provocatively titled Golden Harvest or 
Hearts of Gold?, Peter Stachura characterized Gross as an “anti-Polish propagandist.”160  
Additionally, much like Chodakiewicz, Stachura attacked Gross for allegedly being wildly 
dishonest and accused his work of being incompatible with “traditional notions of sound, 
empirically supported, objective scholarship.”161  As the title of Stachura’s essay implies, i.e. 
“Insults Instead of Facts,” Gross evidently relies upon attacking his opponents rather than using 
logic and argument.  Piotr Gontarczyk offered a similar critique of Gross, who is portrayed as 
having no regard for the truth whatsoever.  Indeed, Gross was pronounced guilty of “scholarly 
fraud.”162  This is a common trend in many of the criticisms of Golden Harvest.  Frequently, 
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Gross is portrayed as an academic charlatan or a hack with no understanding of history.  But then 
sometimes he is a presented as a cynical, malicious and intellectually dishonest propagandist on 
a crusade to discredit the Polish nation using any means possible.  Many of these arguments blur 
the distinction between criticism and ad hominem.   
 In order to bolster the hearts of gold paradigm, Ryszard Tyndorf’s essay documents the 
heroic rescue of Jews by Poles during the Nazi occupation of Poland.163  The same narrative is 
on display in Mark Paul’s essay in the same volume, which documents the escape of Jews from 
Treblinka with the help of Poles.164  Of course, there is actually nothing fundamentally wrong 
with how these essays are written.  What many of Golden Harvest’s critics fail to recognize is 
that, in the very act of selecting a historical topic, one must exclude other topics.  Choosing what 
to write about, indeed, necessarily entails choosing what not to write about.   Gross, for example, 
is engaging with a particular history—one which for too long was not openly discussed.  And 
that is why it is a significant challenge to Polish memory.  When critics attack Gross for not 
adequately assessing acts of Polish heroism alongside Polish crimes, they are simply missing the 
point.  In fact, in creating a false dichotomy between the golden harvest and the hearts of gold 
paradigms, the anti-Gross historians have done precisely what they oppose so much.  
Furthermore, the literature on Polish victimization and heroism is extensively documented.  Why 
do the critics of Gross not attack, say, the authors that describe these histories?  One likely 
explanation is that they are too deeply committed to a nationalistic reading of Polish history, and 
they simply do not like what Gross argues. 
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 Many of Gross’s critics are serious historians.  Chodakiewicz, for example, is a decent 
scholar with respectable academic credentials.  So are many of the other contributors to Golden 
Harvest or Hearts of Gold?, which is a highly polemical but occasionally interesting response to 
Gross’s Golden Harvest.  Many of the criticisms of both Fear and Golden Harvest are absolutely 
valid.  When Gross’s interlocutors allege that he writes history in a very unorthodox style, they 
are absolutely right.  Gross frequently is prone to extrapolation and writes in a very literary 
style—sometimes without extensive documentation.  To phrase the issue somewhat 
provocatively, Gross writes good history badly.  Indeed, his history is good in the sense that it 
elevates important issues, which are not often well understood by the Polish public, into 
mainstream public discourse.  Furthermore, these interpretations reflect troublesome realities that 
provide important challenges to Polish collective memory.  Gross’s history is written badly in the 
sense that it is not always framed in the manner expected by professional historians.  Having a 
unique style is not necessarily a problem, however.  Gross’s style needs to be taken into account 
when reading his texts, and too often his interlocutors have discarded the principle of charity in 
the rush to tear down his ideas.  When reading Gross and his critics, it is important to disentangle 
small picture criticism from big picture criticism.  Small picture criticism, for example, includes 
issues like whether or not Gross adequately documents, say, the death toll at Jedwabne.  This 
kind of criticism is absolutely worthwhile and necessary.  Big picture criticism, however, is 
motivated by undermining—or perhaps completely discrediting—Gross’s central project: 
namely, exposing the history of anti-Semitic violence in twentieth-century Poland.  This kind of 
criticism is too often motivated by nationalistic sentiments and an unwillingness to confront 
unpleasant historical truths. 
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So what, ultimately, can be said about the scholarly debates over Fear and Golden 
Harvest?  In contrast to the discussions spawned by Neighbors, Piotr Forecki has argued that 
little meaningful progress has been made in the dialogues created by Gross’s latter two books.165  
On the one hand, Forecki’s argument is plausible; after all, Gross and his interlocutors have 
become even more deeply entrenched in their views.  The debates now seem stagnant, and many 
of Gross’s most serious critics have become excessively venomous and polemical in their 
responses, and there are fewer voices in Poland coming to Gross’s defense.  These facts, coupled 
with the aforementioned threat of legal action, reinforce a truism: many Poles are now very tired 
of Gross and his assaults on Polish national mythology.  On the other hand, however, Forecki is 
wrong about the impact of Gross’s later works.  Regardless of how these texts are perceived by 
the Polish press, the general public or academia, the arguments presented in Fear and Golden 
Harvest constitute important contributions to the literature on the history of Polish Jews.  Gross’s 
views have now been widely disseminated.  While these views will likely continue to be very 
controversial for the foreseeable future in Poland, it is undoubtedly true that these texts have 
helped to address topics that were previously taboo.  In that sense both Fear and Golden Harvest 
have helped to steer the discussion of Polish memory and hopefully will help to lay the 
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Chapter Five: Current Status of Polish-Jewish Relations 
Poland’s Memory Wars have likely not yet come to an end.  There will almost certainly 
be additional challenges posed in various media—films, artwork, scholarly books, etc.—that will 
continue to undermine excessively narrow and nationalistic accounts of Polish history.  These 
challenges will almost certainly be met with opprobrium.  The last twenty years of debate and 
dialogue have also shown that the responses will be extremely diverse and complex.  With that 
said, today’s Poland is dramatically different than Poland in the 1980s.  With Poland’s 
incorporation into NATO in 1999 and EU accession in 2004, Poland has undergone a radical 
strategic and political reorientation over the last few decades. Poland is no longer an 
authoritarian dictatorship with a state planned economy, but a flourishing democracy with an 
economy that is largely integrated with its new Western allies.  While an economic gap with its 
Western and Northern European counterparts still remains, Poland is no longer a country in 
transition.  The return to Europe is now largely complete.  
  Ultimately, no single social or political issue over the last couple decades has attracted 
as much controversy as the question of Polish anti-Semitism, which is one of the most important 
issues at the heart of the Memory Wars.  How have Poles historically viewed Jews living in 
Poland?  And how have those attitudes changed in recent years?  In order to assess the impact of 
the Memory Wars, one must grapple directly with the question of anti-Semitism in Poland.  This 
cannot be viewed solely as an historical problem. Indeed, one must try to assess the current 
prevalence of anti-Semitic attitudes in contemporary Poland and explore how they have changed 
over the last few decades.  This will require an in-depth analysis of polling data.  Additionally, 
whereas the existing literature on Polish-Jewish relations has been almost exclusively framed by 
cultural and political elites, this will help to shed light on the views of ordinary Poles.  First, 
Bergquist 65 
 
however, it will require a discussion of new ways that the history of Polish Jews is being 
presented to the public.  Perhaps the most important example here is the POLIN Museum of the 
History of Polish Jews, which opened in 2014. 
POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews  
 The construction of memory is a dynamic social process that is highly politicized.  As 
world renowned Czech novelist and perennial candidate for the Nobel Prize in Literature Milan 
Kundera famously put it, “The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against 
forgetting.”166  This means, of course, that political power plays a crucial role in shaping public 
discourses about the past, and that challenging these discourses is necessary in order to alter how 
the past is represented and remembered.   The debates surrounding Gross’s books have 
undoubtedly demonstrated how historians can play a role in this process through their written 
work.  As Peter Burke has argued, however, there are limits to what can be accomplished 
through writing and publishing.  Indeed, though written scholarship can help to preserve 
inconvenient records that undermine or challenge nationalistic historical narratives that distort 
the past, it cannot stop the spread of these distortions.167  This seems quite plausible too; after all, 
even the most successful academic works often have a limited audience.  Even if everyone could 
read and follow the writings of professional historians, however, there would still always be 
those who would remain unconvinced.  It is necessary, therefore, to contemplate other ways of 
constructing collective memory.  One of the most powerful tools for shaping memory are 
museums, which as Turkish Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk remarked are the places where “Time 
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is transformed into Space.”168  Indeed, museums represent public spaces dedicated exclusively to 
memory and meaning.  There is now an extensive historiographical literature on museums, and 
scholars have labeled the diverse functions of museums in numerous ways—such as “memory 
palaces,” “secular temples,” or even “ceremonial time capsules.”169  Museums, ultimately, play 
an important role in the process of inventing (and reinventing) the past, and it should be no 
surprise why museums have become a paramount object of study for scholars of memory.  
Historical narratives are reified through the creation of museum exhibits, and the question of 
how to engage the past—including what is included or excluded in an exhibition, what is 
emphasized or deemphasized, etc.—is the quintessential issue for any museum curator.   
 So naturally, therefore, the question of how to address the Polish-Jewish past and the 
legacy of anti-Semitism in Poland was an enormous problem for the Polin Museum of the 
History of Polish Jews when it was first conceptualized.  Is it better, for instance, to focus 
exclusively on the history of anti-Semitism in Poland, culminating with the Holocaust and the 
near-complete destruction of Poland’s once vast Jewish community?  If so, how then should the 
controversial debates over the role of Poles in the Holocaust be represented?  Or should the 
museum take a different approach to these issues?  Ultimately, those in charge of the museum 
would opt for the latter solution.  As should now be quite clear, the Memory Wars have involved 
a series of extremely divisive debates on Polish history.  If the museum followed Gross’s 
approach, i.e. to wage an all-out assault on Poland’s national mythology, it is likely that many 
Poles would be instantly turned off.  Furthermore, the apparent stagnation in the debates about 
and increasingly hostile reception to Gross’s work in Poland suggests that a new approach to 
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these issues could prove useful—especially if the goal is to attract visitors and to change the way 
those visitors understand and interpret history, which is presumably the goal of virtually all 
museums.  Thus, the Polin Museum of the History of Polish Jews has sought to tell a very 
different—and seemingly neglected—story: how Polish Jews actually lived.  Poland was once 
the epicenter of European Jewish life, yet the Memory Wars suggest that the history of Polish 
Jews is a story of absolute carnage and utter destruction.  But Polish Jews did more than die.  For 
hundreds of years, indeed, they lived—often peacefully with their Polish neighbors—and built 
vibrant communities and a unique culture.  As the current director, Dariusz Stola, explained the 
museum’s central goal, “If someone kills me tomorrow, I would want people to remember my 
life, not just my death. Our basic idea is to show that Jewish life in Poland was richer than the six 
years of the Holocaust.”170  In the end, in order to adequately address the Polish-Jewish past, it is 
necessary to go beyond the horrors of Auschwitz or Jedwabne.   The Polin Museum, ultimately, 
even goes beyond the very issue of Polish-Jewish relations in its effort to depict Polish-Jewish 
history, which is just one layer of this multifaceted history. 
Of course, none of this means ignoring the dark side of Polish-Jewish history.  As 
Christopher H. Smith stated, the Polin Museum was intended to “(commemorate) and 
(remember), with great sorrow, the three million Jews who died during the Holocaust and World 
War II, but also (to celebrate) the rich thousand years of Polish Jewish life.”171  Ewa Junczyk-
Ziomecka, a former Polish secretary of state, further added that the museum would reclaim a 
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“magnificent history” that both Poles and Polish Jews could “learn and cherish.”172  Moreover, 
Junczyk-Ziomecka viewed the establishment of the Polin Museum as a moral obligation that 
could only be fulfilled in the new and democratic Poland.173 None of this is intended to imply 
that this is the “correct” way to portray the history of Polish Jews.  Memory should be pluralistic 
and open to a numerous presentations.  States that elevate a single hegemonic interpretation of 
history tend to be excessively authoritarian or totalitarian.   A more confrontational approach to 
the topic, however, ought not to be favored solely on pragmatic grounds.  Rather than pose a 
needlessly provocative challenge to its visitors, the Polin Museum seeks to “(encourage) 
discussion and (build) awareness among opinion leaders, the media and the general public” in 
the hopes that they will learn to understand that “the history of Poland is not complete without 
the history of Polish Jews.”174 This is undoubtedly a noble yet extraordinarily challenging goal.  
And with expectations of hundreds of thousands of annual visitors and beautiful modern exhibits, 
the museum appears to be off to a good start. 
The Polin Museum of the History of Polish Jews is located in the heart of the former 
Warsaw Ghetto, the site of a fierce Jewish uprising in 1943 against the Nazis that resulted in 
hundreds of thousands of Jewish fatalities. Furthermore, the vast majority of the Warsaw 
Ghetto’s Jewish inhabitants who did not die in the uprising perished at Nazi death camps like 
Treblinka.  Contrasting sharply with this dark history, the museum is located within a stunning 
one hundred million dollar postmodern building designed by the Finnish architects Rainer 
Mahlamäki and Ilmari Lahdelma, who won a major international competition to design the 
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museum.175  When asked why the architects opted for such a beautiful design, Mahlamäki 
acknowledged the unspeakable horrors of the Holocaust but hoped that the museum’s beauty 
could “refer to a better future” between Poles and Jews.176  To further reinforce this message, it 
is worth noting that the museum came about through a collaborative effort by both Poles and 
Jews—though admittedly with considerable international assistance. Still, former Polish 
president Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Shimon Peres, a former Israeli President and Prime 
Minister, both helped to oversee this massive project.177  This level of cooperation between Poles 
and Israelis suggests a willingness to work together and a recognition that the memory of Polish 
Jews can and should be addressed by both sides.  Hopefully the museum can help to build the 
foundations for a better future of Polish-Jewish relations. 
The Polin Museum’s Core Exhibition, which was created by a team of scholars and 
curators led by Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, seeks to reconstruct centuries of Polish Jewish 
life in myriad ways.178 Going all the way back to the Middle Ages, the museum traces the origins 
of Jewish life in Poland and explains how any why Poland became the heart of Jewish culture in 
Europe.  Moreover, the museum reveals the complexity of Polish-Jewish history and emphasizes 
the many variations in Jewish social and religious life throughout the centuries.179  Finally, the 
museum emphasizes personal stories; consequently, the displays contain numerous 
individualized accounts—from rabbis, scholars and chroniclers, merchants, housewives and 
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many others—of the rich, diverse historical experiences of Polish Jews.180  Perhaps the Polin 
Museum’s most impressive display is the partially recreated Gwoździec Synagogue, which was 
located in present-day Ukraine and did not survive the Second World War, including the 
Synagogue’s intricately painted ceiling and timber roof.  Ultimately, the museum is by far the 
most serious attempt to understand and recreate Polish-Jewish life in postwar Poland’s history.  
Because the museum will likely become one of the country’s top attractions, moreover, it has the 
power to help significantly reshape memory about the historical experience and role of Polish 
Jews in the coming years—not just in Poland but throughout the world, as many international 
visitors are expected annually. 
In general, the reception of the Polin Museum has been mostly favorable throughout the 
Polish media.  Wiktor Ferfecki, for example, writing for Rzeczpospolita, which is widely known 
as a conservative paper in Poland, argued that the Polin Museum constitutes a breakthrough in 
the presentation of the Polish-Jewish past—though admittedly Ferfecki’s primary concern seems 
to be how Poles are perceived abroad.181  Similarly, in Gazeta Wyborcza, a more liberal 
newspaper that has often been supportive of Gross throughout the Memory Wars, the museum 
has also been generally portrayed in a positive light.182  The Polin Museum has also been well 
received in Israel.  For instance, Israel’s current President, Reuven Rivlin, attended the opening 
ceremony of the museum.  For Rivlin the history of Polish Jews is a crucial part of Jewish 
heritage: “As a Jew, even if you were not born in Poland, the very name, Poland, gives rise to a 
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shuddering in your body and a longing in your heart.”183  Rivlin, moreover, praised Poles for 
their willingness to confront the dark history of Jedwabne.184  President Bronisław Komorowski 
also attended the opening ceremony and emphasized “the great contribution of (Polish Jews) to 
Polish culture.”185  Nevertheless, the museum also has its critics.  Konrad Matyjaszek, writing for 
Kultura Liberalna, has criticized the Polin Museum for failing to adequately address Polish anti-
Semitism and other troublesome aspects of the Polish-Jewish past.186  One must, however, 
consider such criticisms in the context of what is actually possible in contemporary Poland.  One 
certainly could unveil a hypothetical museum dedicated exclusively to the darkest aspect of the 
history of Polish Jews.  But, honestly, how would that actually be received in Poland?  Would 
such a museum—assuming it could even secure funding—be able to contribute to a constructive 
dialogue on the past?  Or would it simply further exacerbate the already vexing, toxic disputes 
over the memory of the Holocaust and the memory of Polish Jews?  Furthermore, it must be 
noted that the Polin Museum does actually include information on the Holocaust and various 
pogroms before, during and after the Second World War, though such displays are admittedly far 
from the museum’s central focus.  One should not conceive of the Polin Museum as offering a 
challenge to Gross or any other critic of Polish national memory.  On the contrary, the museum 
ought to be conceived as part of a broader process of reassessing the Polish-Jewish past that 
complements previous challenges.  Viewed from this vantage point, the Polin Museum offers an 
invaluable contribution to the reconstruction of Polish collective memory. 
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 There is, of course, a normative question that up until now has not been adequately 
addressed: does the contemporary Polish memory of the Holocaust and the Polish-Jewish past 
actually need to be altered?  This normative question, it must be noted, is inextricably linked to 
an empirical one: namely, how have Poles actually viewed the Holocaust throughout the 
Memory Wars?   Additionally, in order to assess such questions, one must consider the scope and 
extent of anti-Semitism throughout present-day Polish society.  Perhaps the best way to explore 
such questions is to examine the evidence from polling data, which frequently provides a 
window into the general public’s attitude toward controversial issues.  While it is undoubtedly 
the case that public opinion polls are sometimes easy to manipulate, this is not a compelling 
argument against their use; instead, this is a crucial realization that helps to highlight the 
importance of interpreting polling data in a careful and responsible manner.   
 Between December 29, 1994 and January 5, 1995 Demoskop, a Swedish company known 
for its opinion polls, carried out a study for the American Jewish Committee to assess Polish 
attitudes toward the Holocaust.187   The information was gathered through face-to-face 
interviews with 1,145 Poles.   The data Demoskop compiled was broken down in terms of 
gender, education level, age and religion.  Transnational comparisons were also sometimes 
given.  In general, the study found that Poles had a relatively high degree of factual knowledge 
of the Holocaust, but it also found that many Poles strongly identified with a view of Polish 
history that equated Polish victimization with Jewish suffering during the war.188  Moreover, 
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whereas 67% of respondents believed that many Poles participated in efforts to save Jews during 
the Holocaust, only 11% thought that many Poles had participated in the persecution of Jews 
during the Second World War.189   This asymmetry reinforces the assertion by Gross and other 
critics of Polish memory that many Poles have far too often dismissed allegations of Polish 
complicity or collaboration with the Holocaust while actively cultivating a much more virtuous 
wartime narrative that celebrates Polish heroism and sacrifice. Many other questions illustrated 
attitudes toward Jews and the Holocaust that, at least when the study was carried out, also 
seemed problematic.  For instance, to further reinforce the earlier assertion on the perceived 
equivalence of Polish and Jewish victimization, 28% of respondents claimed that Poles had 
suffered more than Jews; by contrast, only 29% of respondents thought that Jews had suffered 
more, whereas 40% viewed Polish and Jewish wartime experiences as about the same.190  Others 
reported that they did not know or gave unrelated responses.  In reply to the question, “Did Poles 
do enough to help Jews during the Second World War?” 49% of respondents maintained that 
Poles had done enough, and 26% alleged that they had done as much as possible given the 
circumstances, whereas merely 15% claimed that Poles had not done enough to aid their Jewish 
neighbors.191   
The Demoskop study also asked Poles whether it was good for the country that there 
were far fewer Jews in present-day Poland than prior to the Second World War.  In response, 
only 5% thought this was a bad development, whereas a disturbing 35% of those polled 
maintained that this was good.  Precisely 51% of respondents viewed the situation as neither 
good nor bad, and the remaining 9%, finally, claimed that that they did not know if it was good 
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or bad or gave unrelated answers.192  A similar study, conducted by Wprost, which was carried 
out after the release of Neighbors, asked the same question and came to an even more 
troublesome conclusion: half of all Poles thought it was good that contemporary Poland had 
fewer Jews than pre-war Poland.193  Returning to the Demoskop study, Poles were also asked 
whether they wanted Jews in their neighborhoods.  Only 6% of respondents said they wanted 
Jewish neighbors, 40% said that it would not matter either way, and unfortunately 30% said that 
they would rather not have Jews in their community.194  
 Of course, it ought to be noted that not all the Demoskop’s findings were negative.  As 
mentioned a moment ago, the study concluded that Poles had a relatively high degree of 
awareness of basic Holocaust facts.  Additionally, Poles strongly endorsed the importance of 
memory.  When asked whether it was time to put the memory of Hitler’s extermination of the 
Jews behind them, a resounding 89% of Poles said that it was necessary to keep remembrance 
strong, whereas only 10% thought that it was time to forget the Holocaust.195  Nevertheless, this 
figure could be partially explained by Poles’ commitment to their own national narrative of 
victimization.  If it was time to forget about Nazi crimes against Jews, then surely it would also 
be time to forget about Nazi (or Soviet) crimes against Poles.   Furthermore, when asked whether 
the Nazi extermination of Jews was no longer relevant today because it happened 50 years ago, 
25% of Poles strongly disagreed and 43% mostly disagreed.  Only 6% of Poles, conversely, 
strongly agreed, but 22% reported that they mostly agreed that the Shoah was no longer relevant.  
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Once again, these findings can be interpreted as a desire to commemorate Poland’s own 
suffering, but it is at least interesting to see that many Poles recognized the importance of 
remembering the Holocaust—particularly if it was the Nazis, and the Nazis alone, that were 
being accused of evil deeds .  It would be undoubtedly interesting to see a similar study on 
Jedwabne.   It is likely that many Poles would deem the pogrom no longer significant—though it 
must be emphasized that the Demoskop study predated Gross and Neighbors.   
 Moreover, the study revealed that 69% of Poles believed that it was important to know 
about and understand the Nazi extermination of Jews, and 17% of respondents claimed that such 
knowledge and understanding was essential.  Only 11% deemed it somewhat important, whereas 
just 1% of Poles said that it was not important at all.196  The study, finally, demonstrated that 
outright Holocaust denial was virtually nonexistent in Poland during the mid-1990s.  Just 1% of 
respondents thought that it was possible that the Holocaust had never occurred; by contrast, 96% 
of Poles maintained that they felt certain it had happened.197  Given that Poland once had 
Europe’s largest and most vibrant Jewish community, this is hardly surprising—especially since 
Poland was home to many of the most notorious Nazi death camps like Auschwitz, Treblinka, 
Bełżec and Chełmno.  Indeed, it would be absolutely absurd and impossible for Polish Holocaust 
deniers to explain away the disappearance of Poland’s Jews.  Furthermore, Holocaust denial—
like in many European states which frequently have less libertarian conceptions of free speech 
than, say, the US—is a crime in Poland.198  Yet it is interesting to note that, while Poles 
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universally rejected any denial of Nazi crimes, just five or six years after this study’s completion 
many Poles would end up denying the truth about Jedwabne when it first came to light. 
 With all that said, while this poll suggests that many Poles in the mid-1990s embraced a 
nationalistic view of history and harbored anti-Semitic attitudes, it necessary to approach these 
findings with a degree of caution.  Social scientists have extensively documented the many 
problems inherent in public polling.  Very subtle issues—such as the wording of the questions 
posed or the order of the questions—can trigger vastly different answers.  Consider, for instance, 
the question that asked whether it was a negative development that contemporary Poland had far 
fewer Jews than pre-war Poland, which only 5% of respondents viewed as an unfortunate 
development while another 35% viewed contemporary Poland’s dearth of Jews as a positive 
development.  If this question had emphasized that the missing Jews had been systematically 
slaughtered by the Third Reich, it is quite plausible that the statistics would have looked very 
different.  Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that this empirical data—taken in 
conjunction with other relevant evidence—helps to bolster the inexorable conclusion that many 
Poles really have had a serious problem confronting the Polish-Jewish past. 
 Of course, Poland is not the same country it was in the mid-1990s.  Consequently, in 
order to get a more accurate portrayal of the current situation, more recent data must also be 
analyzed.  Is there any evidence that compared to the Demoskop study, which was conducted 
during the early stages of the Memory Wars, anti-Semitism in Poland is declining?  A series of 
studies, which were carried out by the Polish sociologist Antoni Sułek between 2002 and 2010, 
provide some reason for optimism.199  In order to shed light on Polish attitudes toward Jews, 
                                                          
 




Sułek’s study relied on polls that asked respondents a series of questions and compared their 
responses over the eight-year period.  In 2002, for example, when asked which (if any) 
minorities had too much influence in Poland, 19% of Poles mentioned Jews, but the data 
suggested that this number had declined to just 6% by 2010.  Similarly, when asked directly 
about the role of Jews in Poland, 43% of respondents claimed that Jews had too much power and 
influence in Polish affairs; however, according to the 2010 study, that number had decreased to 
22%.  The trend, according to Sułek’s interpretation, is undeniable: anti-Semitism in Poland is 
declining.  This trend, moreover, can be seen in all age groups. But Sułek’s conclusion has been 
subjected to criticism.  For Ireneusz Krzeminski, who is also a sociologist, Sułek’s study is one-
sided.  Indeed, Krzeminski points out that it fails to adequately capture the nature of anti-
Semitism, which goes beyond the belief that Jews have secret power and influence within 
society.200  For many Polish anti-Semites, national identity and political consciousness are deeply 
intertwined with their anti-Semitic attitudes.  Such attitudes are pervasive in Poland, argues 
Krzeminski, and one only needs to listen to Radio Maryja, a right-wing ultranationalist radio 
station based in Toruń, in order to perceive this basic truth.201 
 A 2013 opinion poll, which was conducted by the University of Warsaw’s Center for 
Research on Prejudice, also came to a less optimistic conclusion than Sułek.202  According to this 
study, anti-Semitism is deemed a “persistent problem” in contemporary Polish society.203  
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Furthermore, the prevalence of anti-Semitism—which is divided into three different forms: belief 
in Jewish conspiracies, secondary anti-Semitism (defined as the view that Jews have abused the 
Holocaust and are themselves responsible for anti-Semitic attitudes), and traditional anti-
Semitism (defined as the view that Jews are guilty of blood libel or deicide)—has not fluctuated 
significantly in recent years.204  Indeed, the authors found that traditional anti-Semitism had 
slightly increased over the past several years, whereas the other two forms of anti-Semitism had 
declined very minimally.  Other recent polls have shown that not insignificant minorities of 
Poles would refuse to work with a Jewish coworker and that many Poles would not be willing 
accept the marriage of a relative to a Jew.205   
The findings of the 2013 opinion poll were even presented to the Sejm—where the study 
was generally well received by members of the Polish parliament.  Some members of the Sejm 
even suggested potential education measures intended to help fight anti-Semitic prejudices in 
Poland.206  Ultimately, the evidence is unclear on what role the Memory Wars have played in 
shaping the attitudes of ordinary Poles. In fact, the data on anti-Semitism in contemporary Polish 
society is somewhat mixed, and further research is undoubtedly needed to help shed light on 
whether and to what extent Polish attitudes toward Jews have changed over the last several years.  
As Sułek’s study demonstrates, of course, there is some reason—though by no means any 
decisive reason—to see an improvement in Polish attitudes toward Jews since the debates over 
the Polish-Jewish past have reached their climax.  Nevertheless, the findings of the Center for 
Research on Prejudice suggest that attitudes are changing perhaps more slowly.  With that said, 
even many of the troublesome findings of recent public polling data—such as the recent finding 
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that only 14% of Poles would want a Jewish neighbor207—are still technically improvements 
over the findings of the Demoskop study.  This perhaps suggests, at the very least, an 
improvement from the mid-1990s to the present day.  It would be too reductionistic to say that 
this is solely the result of Poland’s attempt to wrestle with its history; after all, there are surely 
myriad causes that help to shape public opinion.  Nevertheless, the process of engaging the 
Polish-Jewish past—including the darkest, most troubling aspects of this history—is likely a 
crucial part of this phenomenon.  By recognizing the historical reality of anti-Semitic violence in 
Poland, many Poles have been able to recognize their own anti-Semitic prejudices and beliefs, 
which is undoubtedly the first step toward changing attitudes.  Ultimately, the data 
overwhelmingly agrees on one point: anti-Semitism is still a major problem in contemporary 
Poland.  Though it is difficult to gauge the exact numbers, there are various estimates that 
suggest that the prevalence of anti-Semitic attitudes is quite high across the country.208  Such 
views are unlikely to disappear completely in the foreseeable future, but hopefully new efforts to 
address the Polish-Jewish past—such as the Polin Museum of the History of Polish Jews—will 
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Chapter Six: Moral Responsibility and Polish-Jewish Reconciliation 
 Much of the existing literature analyzing and debating the Polish-Jewish past falls into a 
common trap.  All too often there are sweeping statements made without proper argumentation 
or elaboration.  Indeed, it is crucial to recognize that there is more at stake in the Memory Wars 
than memory.  The manner in which history is represented and remembered, of course, is 
undoubtedly a crucial aspect of these debates and the point here is not to minimize its 
significance; nevertheless, these debates are also infused with normative questions that are 
routinely ignored or at least not treated with the seriousness they deserve by scholars.  
Ultimately, if there is going to be substantial progress made on the debates over the Polish-
Jewish past, there must be a careful, rigorous analysis of collective moral responsibility; it 
simply is not helpful to presuppose the veracity of this concept without any clarification or 
explication.   
The notion of collective moral responsibility has profound implications for the Memory 
Wars.  Even when Polish scholars accept the reality of significant Polish participation in, say, the 
Jedwabne pogrom, there is still a conversation to be had about what this means for contemporary 
Polish society. Should Poles who had nothing to do with this atrocity feel badly about it?  Is 
there a sense in which modern-day Poles are culpable for this egregious crime?  For many of 
Gross’s critics the answer to such questions is a resounding no, whereas many of those who 
support a reassessment of the Polish-Jewish past disagree profoundly, yet the discussions on this 
issue often suffer from a lack of analytical clarity.  Indeed, many who have addressed the Polish-
Jewish past—including scholars, journalists and political figures—have not done themselves any 
favors by failing to seriously engage with the underlying philosophical issues here.  Consider, for 
example, a handful of Jerzy Turowicz’s assertions, which were by no means exceptional, in 
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response to issues raised by Błoński: “Those among us who have never been anti-Semites and 
who may have fought against it, cannot nevertheless absolve ourselves totally from the collective 
moral responsibility for the anti-Semitism which was so widespread in our country.”209  
Interestingly, Turowicz seemed to offer no real arguments for these claims.  On the contrary, 
these remarks instead were apparently based on unexamined philosophical presuppositions.  Is it 
really the case that those who reject anti-Semitism and even those who fought against it are 
nevertheless partially responsible for the prevalence of anti-Semitic attitudes in Poland?  If so, 
why and in what sense?   
The point here is not necessarily to disagree with the sentiments outlined by Turowicz; 
instead, the point is to highlight one of many examples of the way in which unexamined 
normative claims often slip into these debates and impede progress on these issues.  The scholar 
Piotr Forecki, for example, has asked whether the debates over the Polish-Jewish past have 
constituted a “moral purification” of Polish society.210  Of course, such language presupposes 
that there is a need for moral purification in the first place.  But what exactly is moral 
purification anyway?  And when is it necessary? This is precisely the language that many 
Poles—some of whom even accept that the history of Polish Jews is deeply problematic—find 
objectionable.  Moreover, because they view those who challenge Polish memory as condemning 
the entire Polish nation, many Poles are often exceptionally hostile to counter-narratives.  This 
partially accounts for the often disproportionate responses that inevitably arise when the Polish-
Jewish past is brought up in contemporary Poland.  Indeed, in much of the literature reassessing 
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the Polish-Jewish past, even when such views are not made explicit, there is a failure to seriously 
engage with the moral issues that are inextricably linked to these debates. 
Gross dedicates only a handful of pages to collective moral responsibility in Neighbors, 
and his discussion of the issue is not exactly nuanced; nevertheless, he provides some helpful 
insights.  Interestingly enough, Gross offers at least a superficially explicit rejection of the notion 
of collective responsibility.211  For Gross, indeed, for every atrocity “only a specific murderer or 
group of murderers is responsible.”212  Yet Gross also asserts that individuals cannot arbitrarily 
pick and choose their history.  If individuals constitute nations, and if nations have a genuine link 
to their past triumphs, then nations must also have a genuine link to their past shortcomings—
ergo, individuals must be connected to those shortcomings too.  Just as individual Poles celebrate 
Chopin and Copernicus, Gross maintains, they must also learn to lament the actions of Laudański 
and Karolak, two of the perpetrators of the Jedwabne massacre.213  For they belong to Polish 
heritage just as much as Poland’s heroes, and thus they too have a place in Polish collective 
identity. 
Gross’s views are mostly plausible, yet it is curious that he seems to want to sneak in 
collective responsibility through the back door. On the one hand, he openly disavows the notion, 
but on the other hand his argument seems to endorse collective blame. Clearly a more careful 
analysis is needed.  Of course, it ought to be pointed out that there are many scholars who have 
argued extensively that there cannot be collective moral responsibility.214  Many of these critics 
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have attacked the notion for a variety of reasons and have even challenged the coherence of the 
concept. Indeed, collective responsibility is often said to be impossible because groups—unlike 
individuals—lack moral agency and intentionality, which are conceived as prerequisites for 
genuine moral responsibility.  Hence, it is frequently argued, groups cannot be held praiseworthy 
or blameworthy for their actions; instead, only individual members of groups can be justly 
praised or blamed.215  This characterization of moral responsibility, however, is confused and 
often based on irrelevant concerns.216 It is arguably even anachronistic. In the modern world 
individual actors are often constrained by institutions, and these various institutions—such as 
nation-states, for example—also make actions possible that no single individual (or even group 
of individuals) could accomplish in isolation.  Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the ethics of 
collectives—i.e., the rightness or wrongness of a given action taken by a group—in order to have 
a comprehensive account of moral responsibility.  There is ultimately nothing particularly 
paradoxical about this either; individuals engage in this behavior on a daily basis when, e.g., they 
praise non-profit organizations or charities for their moral triumphs and condemn governments 
and corporations for their moral failings. 
With that said, there is still an interesting issue that arises: once the coherence of 
collective moral responsibility is acknowledged, what about the case of the Polish-Jewish past 
more specifically?  How is it possible to assess the collective moral responsibility of Poles for 
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crimes committed decades ago?  In general, when discussing the collective responsibility for 
crimes from different eras, matters are always more complex.  As a matter of principle, the 
further back in history the crime was committed, the less it makes sense to ascribe collective 
responsibility to a national group.  On this view contemporary Americans share a much higher 
degree of moral responsibility for the egregious war in Iraq than for the perhaps even more 
horrific war in Vietnam.  Yet the passage of time is not the only factor to consider.  For instance, 
when the morality of American slavery is assessed, it is obviously necessary to consider the 
legacy of both slavery and racism in the United States, which still has a profound impact on the 
lives and economic prospects of African Americans. Moreover, when considering the ethics and 
the history of imperialism, it is crucial to assess how Western states have benefited—and in some 
ways continue to benefit—from dominating weaker and less developed societies.  Thus, when 
considering collective moral responsibility for historical crimes, it is important to recognize the 
impact of the crime and whether and to what extent this impact is still felt in the contemporary 
world.  
What about the case of the Polish-Jewish past then?  Well, the impact here is quite 
substantial: the almost complete eradication of Poland’s once vast Jewish community. Poles, it 
must be stressed, were not the primary actors in this crime.  The Nazis were—and always will 
be—the primary butchers of European Jewry, and Germans undoubtedly carry the bulk of moral 
responsibility.  Nevertheless, their crime would have been impossible without the complicity or 
collaboration of millions across Europe.  How many countless individuals ignored the plight of 
their Jewish neighbors?  How many aided Germans when they sought to round up Jews?  And in 
the very worst cases, how many individuals actually participated in the slaughter of Jews?  
Historians have shown that such cases were far from rare or exceptional.  It is obviously not 
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surprising that Poland has become such a critical country in the debates on the Holocaust and 
national responsibility throughout Europe; after all, Poland was home to half of the victims of the 
Holocaust.   It also must be stressed, however, that Poles were by no means unique here.  There 
is plenty of blame to go around.  And there are plenty of countries where atonement is badly 
needed. 
Regardless, there is an even more important kind of moral responsibility that needs to be 
incorporated into this discussion.  It is one thing to say that Poland is blameworthy in some sense 
for its past.  It is another thing, however, to say that contemporary Poles have a moral obligation 
to keep the past alive.  As the philosopher Jeffrey Blustein points out, there is a “moral 
imperative to remember (certain historical events) accurately, to expose fabrication, obfuscation, 
and manipulation, and to preserve for and pass on to succeeding generations the truth about what 
really happened.”217 Indeed, the importance of remembering cannot be overstated here.  The 
obligation to remember the dark past is a crucial realization that all societies must come to terms 
with.  Given that Blustein is right on this central point, critics of Polish national memory like 
Gross or Błoński embarked upon a truly virtuous pursuit: to expose the weaknesses of Poland’s 
nationalistic historical narratives and reveal some of the horrific crimes that have taken place 
against Poland’s Jews.  This troublesome history, which for too long went unnoticed and 
undocumented, has now found itself at the subject of a massive and seemingly never ending 
series of debates, which I have designated the Memory Wars.  But how should these 
reassessments of Polish history ultimately be assessed in moral terms?  Has Poland been able to 
fulfill its obligation to remember?  What would it even mean for Poland to fulfill this obligation?  
Would it mean that every single Pole ought to recognize the importance of remembering the 
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Polish-Jewish past?  Of course not.  As Immanuel Kant famously pointed out, “ought” implies 
“can.”218  In order to assess this moral obligation, it is necessary to consider what is actually 
possible or feasible in Poland.  Regardless of whatever future challenges are posed to Polish 
national memory, Poles are likely to remain extremely sensitive and defensive about this history, 
and this needs to be taken into account.  While many Poles (perhaps even a majority) remain 
hostile to the core issues addressed by the critics of Polish national memory, this should not be 
used as the sole criterion for assessing the Memory Wars.  Instead, it is important to look at how 
far Poland has come in discussing and debating these issues in just a few decades and to consider 
what might be possible in the future.   
Of course, it is also important to recall that Poland truly suffered extraordinary losses 
during the Second World War, and there is certainly a moral obligation to keep this history alive 
too.  The huge disparity in violence on the Western and Eastern Fronts was no coincidence; 
Hitler’s wars against Poland and the Soviet Union were genocidal in nature.  The Third Reich’s 
goal was to acquire lebensraum in the east for the German people, who were presented as the 
Herrenvolk in Nazi propaganda, and this entailed a mass extermination of all so-called racial 
undesirables: Jews, Slavs, Gypsies, homosexuals, etc.219  Poles have both a right and obligation 
to remember these horrific crimes.  But in the end, far too many Poles view any attempt to 
reassess the Polish-Jewish past as a threat to their own sacred history of oppression and 
victimization, and in fact use or instrumentalize this sacred history in order to dismiss or 
discredit the critics of Polish national memory. Yet it does not have to be this way.  It must be 
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recognized that Poles can be both victims and victimizers220; this does not have to be a simple 
binary distinction.  History is always complex, and it is important to present those many nuances 
and complexities—even (perhaps especially) when they clash with national sensitivities.  
Nevertheless, far too many countries fail in their moral duty to keep the past alive.  While Poles 
remain eternally divided on the Polish-Jewish past, the fact that such debates and discussions 
have occurred is undoubtedly a positive development.  Far worse, indeed, would be to simply 
forget about Jedwabne or Kielce.   Poles should be praised for their willingness to confront the 
demons of history and for being passionate about these issues; however, there are also 
undeniably disturbing tendencies that arise whenever the controversies over the Polish-Jewish 
past rear their ugly head.  Ultimately, there are good reasons for both optimism and pessimism 
about the success (or failure) of the Memory Wars in terms of altering the attitudes of ordinary 
Poles.   These debates are far from over, and much will depend on how these issues are presented 
to the Polish public in the future.  With new ways of portraying this vexing history, such as e.g. 
the Polin Museum, which takes a less provocative approach to these issues, there is on balance 
probably more reason for optimism than pessimism.   
Polish-Jewish Reconciliation 
 But what about the issue of Polish-Jewish reconciliation? Is it possible for Poles to finally 
put the past behind them? Is simply commemorating this dark, troublesome history—as many 
Poles have certainly done—enough?  What if, as Avishai Margalit has argued, “memory breathes 
revenge as often as it breathes reconciliation”? Is it possible that “the hope of reaching catharsis 
through liberated memory might turn out to be an illusion”?221  Such a perspective might at first 
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appear attractive; after all, numerous Poles, who perhaps would not have given the Polish-Jewish 
past much thought otherwise, have almost certainly been antagonized by the various mnemonic 
challenges to their history.  As a consequence of these challenges, many Poles surely endorse a 
more nationalistic and anti-Semitic view of their past as a result of the Memory Wars.   At the 
same time, however, many Poles have recognized the errors of history and have adopted a 
genuinely conciliatory tone toward Jews.  Ultimately, if Polish-Jewish reconciliation is to be 
conceived as a genuinely analytically robust concept, it must be interpreted as something that is 
actually feasible.  Not all Poles are going to want to be reconciled with Jews, and many Jews 
would undoubtedly be equally reluctant to accept any reconciliation with Poles.  It is virtually 
impossible for Poles—or any other nation for that matter—to speak with a truly unanimous 
voice, and Poles can hardly be faulted for failing to do the impossible. 
 So how then should reconciliation be conceived?  Regardless of Margalit’s somewhat 
cynical speculation, many scholars agree that truth telling is necessary condition for 
reconciliation, but it is by no means a sufficient one.222  Political apologies are often also 
conceived as a crucial step in the process of reconciliation.223  Of course, the notion of an 
apology itself leads to conceptual confusion—an apology from whom exactly?  Important 
political leaders? The majority of a country’s population?  The latter notion presents obvious 
problems.  Poland, for example, is a country of roughly 38,000,000 individuals.  Suppose that 
one day 19,000,000 of those individuals agreed that it was necessary to sincerely apologize to 
Jews for the country’s historic anti-Semitism, and the remaining half refused to offer such an 
apology.  Now suppose that the following day one individual who had previously refused to 
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apologize changed her mind.  Would Poland’s national apology all of the sudden become 
meaningful?  Of course not.  There can be no hard delineation at which point a nation’s apology 
is really meaningful.  Most scholars, indeed, view reconciliation as a scalar concept.224  What is 
needed is the concept of a collective apology—not an apology of individuals within a collective.   
Surely there can be no better representative to offer a collective apology than a legitimate and 
democratically elected head of state.  This is precisely what happened when Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski apologized for Jedwabne. So is that sufficient?  Some may argue that this apology, 
like perhaps most such apologies, was politically motivated and therefore not sincere.  But then 
what would it take to convince such a critic that an apology was sincere?  How could anyone 
truly know Kwaśniewski’s heart?  And if a sincere collective apology cannot be offered even in 
principle, surely Poles cannot be blamed for failing to apologize. 
 Perhaps this theorizing needs to be more closely tethered to what actual Poles and Jews 
have said regarding the possibility of reconciliation. Paweł Śpiewak, the director of the Jewish 
Historical Institute in Warsaw, for example, points out that over the last few decades there has 
been an explosion of interest within Poland on the topic of Polish-Jewish relations, and that there 
are far fewer anti-Semitic voices entering these discussions than previously.  Ultimately, he 
argues, real Polish-Jewish reconciliation is currently unfolding through the will of a number of 
activists, authors and a large public audience.225  Other Polish scholars—such as Michał 
Bilewicz, Anna Stefaniak and Marta Wikowska—take a slightly different perspective.  Indeed, 
they show that young Poles still have a very confrontational attitude toward Jews, which is at 
least partially the fault of Poland’s education system, and that alternative education opportunities 
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offer perhaps the best chance for true reconciliation.226  For Margalit, the notion of forgiveness, 
which of course is also a necessary condition for reconciliation, requires overcoming resentment 
but not forgetting.227  So for the perhaps 15,000 Polish Jews who remain in the country a crucial 
question to ask is whether they still resent their Polish neighbors for the country’s anti-Semitic 
past (and to a lesser extent present).  Interestingly, many contemporary Polish Jews downplay the 
country’s anti-Semitism and some argue that philo-Semitism may even be on the rise.228 
Whatever the case, certainly more research is needed on Polish Jews to better understand their 
attitude toward these issues. 
 In the end, whether or not it has been truly achieved, it is evident that Poles have at the 
very least taken meaningful strides toward reconciliation, which admittedly is not the only 
desirable outcome of the Memory Wars.  Even if reconciliation has not yet—or even cannot—be 
achieved, the unilateral pursuit of a more complete, truthful history is still a noble goal.  While 
there are no easy answers when it comes to concepts like “collective responsibility” or 
“reconciliation,” it is important to strive for clarity in these discussions.  Both the accusatory and 
exculpatory literatures routinely employ moralistic language without carefully explaining how 
such language is defined or interpreted.  This is not simply a matter of being philosophically 
reckless; indeed, this often exacerbates the controversies over the Polish-Jewish past and 
impedes serious dialogue.  This chapter, of course, does not claim to have any final, definitive 
answers on these concepts, but instead it should be read as suggesting a more careful way of 
framing these important issues. 
                                                          
226 Michał Bilewicz, Anna Stefaniak and Marta Wikowska, “Polish Youth Confronting the Jewish Past,” in 
Reconciliation in Bloodlands, 109. 
227 Margalit, 208.  
228 Katka Reszke, Return of the Jew: Identity Narratives of the Third Post-Holocaust Generation of Jews in 




   Perhaps the latest battle in Poland’s Memory Wars occurred in the aftermath of a speech 
by FBI director James Comey on April 15, 2015 at the Holocaust Memorial Museum’s National 
Tribute Dinner.  During his speech, which was intended to be a general assessment of human 
nature’s propensity for evil, Comey said, “In (the perpetrators’) minds, the murderers and 
accomplices of Germany, and Poland, and Hungary, and so many, many other places didn’t do 
something evil. They convinced themselves it was the right thing to do, the thing they had to do. 
That’s what people do. And that should truly frighten us.”229  Predictably, these comments 
provoked outrage in Poland.  It is true, of course, that Comey’s remarks do not tell the entire 
story.  Poles were under Nazi occupation, and it is undoubtedly a terrible mistake to see Poles 
and Nazis as equal partners in the slaughter of European Jewry—but it is far from obvious that is 
what Comey was suggesting, and only a very uncharitable reading of his speech would suggest 
otherwise.  In response to Comey, Ewa Kopacz, Poland’s current Prime Minister, lamented those 
“incapable of presenting historic truth in an honest way” and claimed that “Poland was not a 
perpetrator but a victim of World War II.”230  Even more bizarrely, Polish president Bronisław 
Komorowski remarked that Comey’s comments reflected his “ignorance, lack of historical 
knowledge and possibly large personal aversion (toward Poles).”231  An apology was demanded 
for Comey’s perceived “insult,” which was eventually given by Comey.232  This was in part 
                                                          
229 James Comey, “Why I require FBI agents to visit the Holocaust Museum,” last modified April 16, 2015, 
The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-scariest-lesson-of-the-
holocaust/2015/04/16/ffa8e23c-e468-11e4-905f-cc896d379a32_story.html 
230 Rick Lyman, “Poland Demands Apology Over F.B.I. Director’s Holocaust Remarks,” The New York 
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/21/world/europe/poland-angry-james-comey-fbi-director-
holocaust.html?_r=0 
231 Ibid; Komorowski’s response, which seems particularly surprising given his earlier Jedwabne apology, 
makes at least some sense in the context of his campaign for reelection; however, Komorowski would eventually 
lose to Andrzej Duda of the right-wing Law and Justice Party. 




precipitated by a letter signed by the heads of numerous prominent Polish historical institutions, 
which repudiated Comey and reminded readers that Poland had been “divided between two 
murderous totalitarian regimes” and that Poles had “fought for our freedom and yours.”233  
 The Polish-Jewish past remains as fiercely contested as ever. As the Comey affair 
demonstrates, the memory of the Second World War and the Holocaust will not likely fade away 
in the near future; instead, these memories will remain ultra-politicized and the source of 
continued debate and polarization.  The Comey affair also shows that there is a need for clarity 
and caution before rushing to judgment.   Given a charitable reading, which is placed into the 
context of Comey’s actual speech, the remarks in question were perfectly reasonable.  As Gross 
and others have shown, there really are cases of terrible anti-Semitic violence in twentieth-
century Polish history both before, during and after the Second World War that need to be 
addressed.  There is a legitimate fear that the critics of Comey will obscure or undermine this 
important history.  At the same time, however, there is a larger context within which to discuss 
Polish-Jewish relations.  To reiterate once again, Poles indubitably were the victims of both Nazi 
and Soviet aggression. And many Jewish lives were spared as a direct result of Poles who risked 
their own lives—as well as the lives of their families—in order to shelter Jews.234  Despite this 
larger context, it hardly seems fair—particularly given the location of the speech—to expect the 
director of the FBI to have given a detailed exposition of Polish wartime history.  The response 
in Poland was ultimately grossly disproportionate to the content of Comey’s speech. 
                                                          
233 “Letter to the FBI director James Comey - Warsaw, April 21, 2015,” The Institute of National 
Remembrance, http://ipn.gov.pl/en/news/2015/letter-to-the-fbi-director-james-comey-warsaw,-april-21,-2015 
234 As Poles frequently point out, Yad Vashem recognizes more Poles among the Righteous Among the 
Nations than any other nationality; “Names and Numbers of Righteous Among the Nations - per Country & Ethnic 
Origin, as of January 1, 2015,” http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/statistics.asp. 
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 In many ways, Poles have done an admirable job engaging with their history, which 
ought to be a source of national pride and international encouragement.  Nevertheless, there are 
also always disturbing tendencies that arise whenever the Memory Wars enter into public 
discourse.  It would be a terrible shame to see the advances made in the process of Poland’s 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung slip away in the coming years as a result of nationalist right-wing 
hostility.  Ever since the release of Shoah and the publication of “The Poor Poles Look at the 
Ghetto,” Poles have embarked upon an important period of reevaluation of Poland’s wartime 
experiences, which has profoundly impacted Polish collective memory and the country’s attitude 
toward Jews.  The core issues in these debates, which were also highlighted by the controversies 
over Auschwitz, have left a powerful mark on the Polish public sphere.  The Memory Wars 
reached their zenith with Gross and the debate spawned by Neighbors.  While Błoński had his 
defenders within Poland, Gross’s book represented the first moment in which many Poles 
acknowledged the country’s own history of anti-Semitic violence.  Additionally, Polish 
politicians stepped up and addressed these controversies and often in a way that expressed 
remorse and a desire for atonement.  Compared to the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, where 
forgetfulness toward the local circumstances behind the disappearance of Europe’s Jews too 
often reigns supreme, this is virtually unprecedented. Polish artists and filmmakers have also 
played a crucial role in the unraveling of Poland’s national memory.  Indeed, films like Pokłosie 
and Ida have helped to challenge the narratives of victimization and heroism, thereby offering a 
more complete account of Polish history. 
The debates over Gross’s Fear and Golden Harvest are more difficult to assess.  Gross 
was, quite disturbingly, accused of criminally distorting the facts in his assault on Polish national 
mythology, which was a major step in the wrong direction for Poland.  Yet it is also reassuring 
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that Gross was never forced to defend himself against these absurd charges in court.  While both 
books constitute important additions to the literatures on the Polish-Jewish past, perhaps it is 
time to consider new ways to address Polish-Jewish relations.  Jan Tomasz Gross has done 
extraordinarily important work in this regard, and he should be commended for his role in these 
debates.  For the Memory Wars, at the risk of being too hyperbolic, Gross arguably represents 
what Napoleon represents to the Napoleonic Wars; in short, it is inconceivable that the state of 
reassessing Polish memory could be where it is today without Gross’s accomplishments.   
However, the time for Gross’s more strident approach has probably passed.  Jan Gross is 
now a figure that is far too polarizing for many Poles, and anything he might contribute on the 
topic of Polish-Jewish relations in the future will only likely exacerbate the extremely hostile and 
ultra-nationalistic reactions that his most recent works on the subject have elicited.  As time 
passes and the wounds of memory heal, it is likely that Gross’s harshest critics will become less 
and less prominent and perhaps the day will come when Poles will wonder why these debates 
engendered so many hysterical responses in the first place.  Tone ultimately matters a great deal, 
and much of the future of Polish-Jewish relations depends on how the Polish-Jewish past is 
presented to the broader public, which as recent empirical data shows still retains anti-Semitic 
attitudes and prejudices. The Polin Museum, with its emphasis on life rather than death, is one 
hopeful way of increasing Polish understanding of the country’s minority Jewish heritage, which 
is an important part of Poland’s history.   
It is also crucial to try to reformulate these debates in a way that emphasizes clarity and 
analytical precision. When scholars and officials discuss these complex and vexing issues, it is 
necessary to be careful how philosophically controversial terms like “collective responsibility” 
are employed.  Indeed, far too often Poles reject the critics of national memory because they see 
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it as a closed-minded indictment of their entire nation.  These issues need to be confronted in a 
serious and sensitive way.  Finally, it is important to stress the successes of Poland’s struggle 
with its history rather than focus solely on its failures.  Few countries can say that they have 
come as far as Poland when it comes to engaging with the dark past of the Second World War, 
and few countries can claim that have made comparable strides toward reconciliation with those 
they have wronged.  Poland’s faults and failures should not be forgotten, but it is important to 
celebrate Poland’s achievements.  To excessively condemn the Polish nation indeed only 
strengthens the nationalistic and anti-Semitic trends in Polish memory.  However much longer 
the Memory Wars last, there are encouraging signs that Poland is moving in the right direction 
on these issues.  The process of Poland’s Vergangenheitsbewältigung is slow and painful, but the 
reward is a kind of moral or spiritual regeneration that promises a future history that Poles can 
truly cherish and celebrate. 
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